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Abstract
Scholars tend to explain contemporary conflicts by referring to ambiguously defined
processes of globalization. Given this conceptual vacuum, I build a theoretical model that
explains the transformation of war through a rigorous analysis of globalization from
multiple temporal perspectives. This Braudelian model, which examines the warfighting
paradigm, the social mode of warfare, and the historical structure of war, is then used to
explain globalist radical Islam. My findings indicate that the emergence of global
network societies has had a profound, transformative effect on jihadist violence and,
more broadly, on the global mode of warfare.
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Introduction

“War is fought by human beings”
-

Carl Von Clausewitz

A YouTube video titled “Did You Know?” tries to describe the scale and scope of
the information technology revolution that began in the final decades of the 21st century.
Created in November 2008 and viewed more than a million times by April 2009, the
video is essentially a well-designed presentation of some interesting facts about our
contemporary moment. One fact in particular, I think, especially speaks to the muchhyped transition from the Modern or Industrial to the diversely labeled postmodern,
globalized, informational, networked world. The video tells us that the radio, first
marketed in the 1890s, took thirty eight years to reach an audience of 50 million. The TV
achieved the same feat in 13 years and the internet in just four. The iPod, unveiled in
2001, took three years to reach 50 million consumers while Facebook took only two. The
video leaves us with the question “What does all this mean?”
This paper is not going to try and answer that question – finding the meaning of
globalization is best left to those more philosophically inclined – but it does take
seriously the notion that the end of the second millennium marks a time of significant
change in social, political, and economic structures. Though magnitude of these changes
is much debated, the idea that globalization has had a profound effect on humanity has
caught on and been popularized by politicians, artists, news personalities, and scholars.
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Globalization theory has been used to explain changes in financial systems, trade
relations, international governance institutions, and more. This paper is concerned with
the argument that globalization has transformed the institution of war, an idea that
sparked a scholarly trend in the late 1990s and continued through the first years of this
century. Strangely, these theorists of New War have thus far seemed reluctant to apply
their analysis to understand what is perhaps the foremost topic on the current global
security agenda – contemporary jihadist violence.
The outpouring of literature in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks (though in all
fairness there were notable contributions before 2001 as well) has attempted to explain
globalist radical Islam in a variety of ways, and indeed several scholars have placed
globalization in a central position when explaining this form of extremist violence. Yet
none have offered a rigorous theoretical model for the transformation of violence through
globalization and then applied such a model to understand contemporary jihad. This
paper thus bridges two bodies of literature, the first focusing on the transformation of war
and the second on globalist radical Islam.
The aim of this paper is not to provide a definitive word on either the
transformation of war debate or on globalist jihad, but rather to spark a new line of
inquiry that may lead to a better understanding of both topics. At present, New War
remains under-theorized while globalist jihad remains well described though poorly
understood. By first offering a rigorous theorization of the effects of globalization on war
and then using this theoretical framework to understand what and how aspects of
contemporary jihadist violence, I hope to make a contribution to scholarship in both
fields. In addition, this paper is in some ways a test of globalization theory in general – if
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it is true that social life on many different levels is being transformed, then war,
understood as a socially embedded institution, must also be undergoing profound change.
My paper leans heavily toward the academic side of political science and I do not
deal extensively with policy. As such, the emphasis is on understanding and explaining
phenomenon, and not on prescribing solutions to political problems. Nonetheless, it is my
firm belief that in order to design effective policy, it is necessary to first have an adequate
grasp of the issues being addressed, and as such this paper may be of interest not only to
more academically inclined scholars but also to students of international policy.

I. Methodology and Roadmap
The format of my paper somewhat resembles what John Odell has called the
disciplined interpretive case study, a method that “interprets or explains an event by
applying a known theory to the new terrain” (2002, p. 67). My focus, unlike Odell’s
greater concern with the case study, is evenly split between theorizing the transformation
of war and understanding contemporary jihad. While the disciplined interpretive case
study may spawn “new suggestions for improving the theory” (2002, p. 68), I begin with
a theoretical contribution and then move on to my case. The reasons for this approach are
fairly obvious – I do not believe current theories of New War are adequate. As I will
discuss in the next chapter, work on the transformation of war through globalization tends
to under-theorize globalization, ignore non-Western war, and ultimately describe rather
than explain contemporary conflict. Given these known shortcomings in the New War
literature, it makes little sense to first study a case and then discuss its theoretical
repercussions.
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In order to build a convincing theoretical framework, it is necessary to
begin with a discussion of previous contributions to understanding war and globalization.
Chapter two therefore reviews the extant literature on the topic, concluding that an
appropriate theory of war transformation must theorize globalization, understand the idea
of a segmented globality, and then conceptually isolate different temporal layers through
which war can be analyzed. Chapter three then offers such a model, building on Manuel
Castells’ idea of network societies, Martin Shaw’s understanding of segmented globality,
and Andrew Latham’s Braudelian model of understanding the transformation of war.
Combining the work of these scholars, I argue that in order to fully understand the effects
of globalization on war, it is necessary to acknowledge a segmented globality, understand
globalization as the rise of network societies, and analyze the warfighting paradigm, the
social mode of warfare, and the historical structure of war. As will be discussed in more
detail later, these three units of analysis are analogous to Fernand Braudel’s three
temporal perspectives - l’histoire évenméntielle, conjunctural time, and the longue durée.
Chapter four then uses the theory summarized above to understand
contemporary jihadist violence. More specifically, I analyze the warfighting paradigm
and the social mode of warfare in globalist radical Islam, concluding that the New War
model, appropriately theorized, offers a convincing lens through which we may
understand contemporary jihad. The historical structure of war, while an important unit
of analysis, is not utilized in the case study because its depth and scope are too broad.
The theoretical chapter discusses the implications of globalization on the historical
structure of war at a broader level, and that analysis too is heavily qualified as there is not
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enough evidence to suggest that this deepest level of transformation has indeed taken
place. The final chapter sums up the work and offers suggestions for future research.

II. Defining key concepts – War, globalization, and contemporary jihadist
violence
At this stage, it is important to establish some working definitions for key
concepts explored in the paper. Before proceeding further, I feel compelled to restate
Charles Tilly’s advice on attempts to define large social processes, that “although
definitions as such cannot be true or false, in social science useful definitions should
point to detectable phenomena that exhibit some degree of causal coherence”. (Tilly,
2004, p. 8) In later sections, this paper will further explore the ideas discussed below, but
for now these definitions should suffice.

A. War
Understanding war has been a central concern of political scientists since the birth
of the discipline. Needless to say, theoretical approaches to the topic have varied over
time, developing simultaneously with changes in both world structures and academic
trends. Defining war, therefore, is not as easy or intuitive as it may initially seem. The
first significant war theorist, Carl von Clausewitz, defined war as both “the continuation
of politics by other means” and “nothing more than a duel” (as quoted in Bassford, 2008).
Clausewitz’s dialectic approach, identifying both the purely violent and the intricately
political dimensions of war, is an appropriate starting point in defining war.
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Clausewitz draws an important distinction between absolute war and real war.
The former, and this is different from similar terms like “total” war, is a theoretical
abstraction, an understanding of war as “nothing more than a duel”, or, to put it in the
simplest terms, a violent conflict where each side attempts to destroy the other. Absolute
war carries no historical, social or political attachments – there are no motives or
motivations, no socioeconomic dynamics at play, and certainly no concern for power
politics. Absolute war is nothing more than “a wrestling match on a larger scale”, and this
is what Clausewitz considers to be the unbending, historically continuous nature of war
(Bassford, 2008).
The character of war, on the other hand, is susceptible to change. This is where
war is taken down from its absolute pedestal and discussed as “real war”. Now, war
becomes embroiled in history, culture, and society, or, as Clausewitz put it, becomes “the
continuation of politics by other means”. In Christopher Bassford’s words, “real war is
constrained by the ever-present social and political context, by human nature, and by the
restrictions imposed by time and space” (Bassford, 2008).
To understand and define war, we must keep both of these concepts in mind. At
its essence, war is always organized political conflict. As such, war has existed since the
beginning of human history. Clearly, however, war in the 21st century is different from its
modern and pre-modern predecessors. Importantly, the character of violent conflict also
varies across space. While the task of defining absolute war is relatively straightforward,
Clausewitz does not provide us with a framework to examine real war, other than to say it
is contextual in every sense, except that it is always violent. In this paper, I treat the
nature of war as an ontological constant and focus instead on the varying character of
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war. The project of redefining the nature of war is not mine, and instead I follow Colin
Gray’s advice that “war should not be approached in ways that would divorce it from its
political, social, and cultural contexts” (Gray, 2005, p. 15).
Finally, it is important to define three distinct components of the character
of war, as identified by Andrew Latham (2002, 2008, forthcoming). A more detailed
discussion will follow in the theoretical framework offered in Chapter three, but at this
point it is nonetheless beneficial to establish working definitions for these terms to avoid
confusion. First, on the most basic level, is the warfighting paradigm, which deals with
the “specific configuration of military technologies, doctrines, and organizational forms”
(Latham, 2008, p. 120). This is shaped by both technological conditions and the will and
power of human agents. Second, from a broader temporal lens, we can speak of the social
mode of warfare. Adapting the work of Kaldor, Latham (2002) defines this as “the way in
which a state-society complex organizes for and conducts war” (p. 240). The social mode
of warfare thus deals with more than the actions on the battlefield, and includes the socioeconomic dimensions of war. For example, a defining feature of contemporary war, as
opposed to its previous incarnations, is the important relationship between international
weapons markets and private war conducting units. Historically, wars tended to result in
a shift toward a more autarkic economy (with trade inside colonial powers considered
internal). This change in the economics of war is broader than that discussed in the
warfighting paradigm. Finally, and now we enter the realm of the abstract, is the
historical structure of war. Seen from the temporal perspective of the longue durée, the
historical structure of war “is the politico-cultural institution of war itself…the deeply
embedded cultural rules, discourses and practices that determine the locus of control of
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organized violence, define the nature and purpose of war, and that ultimately set war
apart from other forms of politics and violence” (Latham, 2002, p. 247). To put it in
different, and perhaps simpler, words, the historical structure of war refers to the place
occupied by the institution of war in any given social imagination.

B. Globalization
Often used but rarely defined, the term “globalization” has become a hackneyed
phrase in contemporary academic lexicon.1 Nevertheless, few disagree that the
contemporary period, identified as beginning with the end of the Cold War, has been one
of increasing global interconnectedness. While I am persuaded by the argument that
globalization as a historical process began long before the 20th century and discuss this
point in more detail below, for the sake of convenience, I use the term to refer to the
intensification of global communication, political, economic, and cultural networks
beginning at some point in 1980s.2 While there is a tendency to equate globalization with
improvements in technology, especially those dealing with communication and finance,
the term is better understood as a more sweeping phenomenon, characterized by the
increasing pace of modern social life, what David Harvey calls “time-space compression”
(Harvey, 1989) and the heightened importance of “rapidly developing and ever-densening
networks of interconnections and interdependences” (Tomlinson, 1999, p. 2).
Technology, to be sure, has been a major catalyst for globalization, yet to reduce the
phenomenon to the realm of technology would be a gross oversimplification.

Rosenberg (2005) makes this point in especially strong terms
While identifying specific dates and events that mark the beginning of the “era of
globalization” is a worthy task being pursued by a number of scholars, it is too tangential
to be focused on here.

1

2
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Similarly, to treat globalization as a purely economic concept, characterized by
the opening up of previously closed markets through free trade, the liberalization of
financial systems, increasing privatization and other neoliberal economic acts, is also to
consider only part of the whole. There is little doubt that the global economy is
increasingly interconnected, interdependent and homogenizing in a capitalist direction.
Furthermore, these economic trends have tremendous implications on local, regional, and
global social life and thus need to be seriously considered. However, even though there
are both overlaps and causal connections directed both ways, it is important to
differentiate between the economic side of globalization and the broader social side, of
which the economic is one dimension.
A further clarification is necessary here. As Amartya Sen (2002) notes,
“globalization is often seen as global Westernization”, as the (sometimes forced) export
of Western ideas and ideals and the obliteration of local cultures. This view is both
historically and theoretically inaccurate. From a historical perspective, as Sen details, it is
a tragic misconception to think of democracy, reason, even capitalism as hailing solely
from the West. For a variety of political and historical reasons, perceptions of such
concepts have tended to be treated as originating and then being exported from the West,
and now, even though the first known republic was in Vaishali, India, and Muslim rulers
in medieval times were far more pluralistic than their Christian counterparts, and the first
modern scientists worked in Baghdad and Al Andalus, the concepts of “Democracy” and
“Pluralism” and “Reason” are considered entirely Western. While I treat the term
globalization to refer to the processes begun in 1989-90, I understand the phenomenon as
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having truly global roots. In this paper, the term globalization does not inherently carry
imperialistic or hegemonizing traits.
A final point on globalization completes this brief discussion of the concept.
Deterritorialization, the weakening relationship between culture and place, is an
important facet of globalization and holds special relevance to this paper. Like the
broader trend of which it is a part, deterritorialization can be traced back through history
and the many major human migrations, and thus requires further sharpening when being
used in the contemporary context. In this paper, I follow Olivier Roy’s lead and use the
term to specifically refer to the “blurring of the borders between Islam and the West”, to
the extent that “Islam is less and less ascribed to a specific territory and civilizational
area” (Roy, p. 18). A simple statistic highlights the extent to which Islam has been
deterritorialized – it is estimated that up to one third of Muslims live in countries where
they are a minority (Roy, p. 18).

C. Contemporary jihadist violence
Following the attacks of 9/11, there was an explosion of literature on terrorism.
More specifically, all forms of social scientists, from psychoanalysts3 and economists4 to
sociologists5, political scientists6, and historians7, became obsessed with the idea of
understanding “Islamic terrorism”. Unfortunately, commentators on the subject

See for example Post’s (2007) The Mind of the Terrorist and Sageman’s (2008) Leaderless
Jihad
4 Napoleoni’s (2005) Terror Incorporated is a good example
5 For example Roy’s (2006) Globalized Islam.
6 Burgat’s (2003) Face to face with Political Islam and Kepel’s (2002) Jihad: the trail of
political Islam are examples
7 See for example Cook’s (2005) Understanding Jihad and Nafziger and Walton’s (2003)
Islam at War: A history
3
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immediately took to using such terminology, thus associating a religion practiced by
more than a billion people with the actions of a tiny, non-representative minority. This
minority, to be sure, was explicit about its belief that its actions were inspired by Islam,
yet to use terms like Islamic terrorism, Islamo-fascism, and Islamic extremism, and thus
imply a link between the religion and the barbaric violence carried out by a small
minority of its practitioners, seems not only unwise and imprudent but also inaccurate.
This terminology, nonetheless, has entered the vocabulary of commentators on the
subject and appears unlikely to disappear anytime soon. Consequently, it is important to
clearly define the terms used when discussing this form and source of violence.
In this paper, the focus of my study is the violent globalist manifestation of
terrorism inspired by radical interpretations of Islam. To further clarify, groups that are
composed of Muslims but have local political aims, such as those based in southern
Thailand fighting for autonomy or some of Kashmir’s separatist organizations8, are not
considered.
A further qualification regarding an unavoidable bias of scope is important to
acknowledge. The literature on contemporary jihadist violence is, not surprisingly,
skewed toward understanding Al Qaeda, which is one of a number of groups make up the
globalist jihadist movement. While serving as an umbrella organization for other groups
and being the largest, most visible, and most influential of the globalist jihadist
organizations, it would be inaccurate to treat Al Qaeda as a representative of all such
actors. It is therefore important to acknowledge that my contribution to understanding
contemporary jihadist violence, being entirely literature based, contains an unavoidable
I am aware that some of these have merged with more globalist groups, yet there
remain a number of organizations that exist solely to create an independent or Pakistani
Kashmir.
8
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magnification of Al Qaeda’s role. Where possible, I have attempted to diversify the
literature by using multiple examples.
When discussing contemporary jihad, scholars have sometimes sought to find the
ontological definition of the term. As a Political Scientist, I follow Roy’s advice and stay
away from seeking to interpret the “True” meaning of the term. Roy argues that what is
more important than interpreting religious texts is examining interpretations that result in
actions. As such, David Cook’s historical analysis of the role of jihad in the history of
Muslim peoples is an important work. Cook’s work traces the evolution of the meaning
of jihad through the history of Islam, acknowledging that there was never a universally
accepted definition for the term. At present, the vast majority of Muslims interpret jihad
as a peaceful inner struggle, what has been labeled the “greater jihad”. In this paper, I
deal exclusively with the violent, globalist understanding of jihad that projects itself onto
not the individual or even the state but on mankind in general. This specific brand of
radical jihadist thought can be directly traced to the placing of violent jihad as a pseudosixth pillar of Islam by Egyptian thinker Sayid Qutb.9 Qutb’s writings in the 1960s
argued that the Muslim world had reverted to a pre-Islamic state of ignorance, Jahilliya.
While using many modern examples and discussing the ills of democracy and
Westernization, Qutb was also harsh on his predecessors, claiming that in the last few
centuries the Muslim community had failed to embrace Islam and make the religion,
which he contraposes with materialism, the purpose of existence (Khatab, 2006).

9 Cook (2005) considers Qutb the founder of contemporary radical Islam (p. 102). News
outlets have also identified Qutb as the philosopher behind Al Qaeda, see for example
Irwin (2001).
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To reclaim their religion’s original divine promise, Qutb advocated an
increasingly violent adoption of jihad, beginning with “peaceful proclamation” and
following a “logical progression…to warfare on a limited scale, to revenge for wrongs
done to the Muslims, to the final stage of unlimited warfare” (Cook, 2005, p. 104). Thus
for Qutbists, among whom is Al Qaeda’s chief ideologue Ayman Al-Zawahiri, violent
jihad is a fundamental attribute of a “true” Muslim.
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TWO

Reviewing New War

The Western world has a real problem with the concept of war these days…military
superiority is now highly concentrated; conflict is now highly dispersed.
-

Michael Clarke

In this review of the literature, I trace the evolution of New War theory. I begin by
discussing the early contributions that identified changes in the character of war through
globalization processes. These first attempts at theorizing late 20th century conflict were
(rightly) criticized for being empirically imperfect and theoretically unclear, especially
with regard to differentiating between the independent and dependent variable. I then
move on to consider arguments that better theorize globalization and attempt to place war
within the larger social transformations taking place. While useful, we are still left with a
largely descriptive, rather than explanatory model. Finally, I look at works that offer a
more adequate conceptualization of historical change, so that we may see the
transformation of war, and explain the different ways in which globalization has changed
the character of organized political conflict.
The idea that the institution of war was undergoing transformative change became
popular at the turn of the century with the publishing of Mary Kaldor’s New and Old
Wars (first edition 1999). Kaldor argued that globalization had fundamentally
transformed the nature and character of war. Since then, a number of scholars have both
criticized the idea that war is being transformed and attempted to build on, or at least
pursue offshoots of, Kaldor’s original thesis. The focus of the literature has shifted from
14

understanding the how and what of contemporary war to identifying the (changing) place
of war in contemporary world order and society. Ultimately, the detractors have served
the important function of forcing the proponents of the larger New War framework to
sharpen their arguments by better defining the parameters, addressing empirical errors,
historicizing war, and adequately theorizing globalization. Gone are historically
inaccurate arguments contending that intra- and trans-state conflicts are unprecedented or
that contemporary conflict is bloodier than the modern wars of the 20th century.10
Scholars have instead attempted to both further nuance the analysis of contemporary
conflict as well as try and place it within the larger sociological context. To put it
differently, the New War literature has developed from one that dealt exclusively with
particular forms of violence to a broader and more empirically accurate analysis of the
consequences of an increasingly globalizing world.
At present, however, there is no universally accepted theoretical framework to
approach the transformation of war. Before proceeding to describe such a framework, it
is useful to take a look back at how analyses of contemporary war have changed over the
last decade. An important caveat must be pointed out at this juncture. Since the mid1990s, there have been notable contributions to understanding the effects on war of
changes in technology (the Revolution in Military Affairs), the seemingly increased
prevalence of civil war in the post-Cold War era, and analyses of geographically specific
conflicts. I do not directly look as these literatures and am more interested in macro-level
approaches to understanding the interaction between war and globalization.

10

Booth (2001) and Newman (2004) were quick to point out these shortcomings
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I. Kaldor, Münkler, Duffield: First attempts at theorizing globalized war
International Relations (IR) literature in the aftermath of the Cold War was
flooded with discussions of monumental changes. Nearly twenty years later, both the
nature and extent of the “new” post-bipolar world remains ambiguous. Without the
benefit of hindsight, the fall of the Berlin Wall was greeted with grand proclamations of
world peace and prosperity, exemplified by Francis Fukuyama’s now cliché declaration
that we were witnessing “Not just the end of the Cold War…but the end of history as
such: that is, the end point of mankind's ideological evolution and the universalization of
Western liberal democracy as the final form of human government” (Fukuyama, 1992, p.
xi). Soon enough, though, it became clear that processes of “ideological evolution” were
far from complete – violent conflict persisted in Somalia, Sri Lanka, Kashmir, and,
perhaps most significantly for Western academicians, Yugoslavia. While some argued
that these conflicts were not historically unprecedented,11 an increasing number of IR
scholars, led by Mary Kaldor, contested that the transformation of world order had
resulted in (though the direction of causality is unclear) the transformation of war. The
era of “Modern” or “Old War”, roughly defined as conflict between formally organized,
hierarchically structured and functionally specialized public institutions of organized
violence – that is, institutions acting on behalf of the state – was, according to Kaldor and
others, coming to an end. More specifically, Kaldor maps out three constitutive elements
of war that have transformed in the era of globalization:
1. Objectives: Whereas Old War was about defending or improving a state’s position
within the geopolitical sphere, New War is about the pursuit of power “on the basis of
Chojnacki (2006) and Newman (2004) make the argument that nothing about these
wars is new – similar characteristics have existed throughout the 20th century.

11
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a particular identity – be it national, clan, religious or linguistic” (Kaldor, 2007, p. 6).
To put it a little differently, identity politics replaces state interest as the primary
motivator of organized political violence. This shift from state-focused to a more
particularistic form of violence, Kaldor argues, is responsible for the seeming
increase in forms of violence meant to “cleanse” populations, with genocide being the
most extreme outcome.

2. Political Economy: The post-Cold War era, argues Kaldor, has seen the
transformation of the Political Economy of war. In the Modern Era, which is to say
the time between the end of the Second World War and the collapse of Communism,
a breakout of War tended to see countries revert to an autarkic system of rule; the
finance and production of war-making units would become almost completely
nationalized. As Kaldor identifies, “the term ‘war economy’ usually refers to a system
which is centralized, totalizing, and autarchic” (Kaldor, 2007, p. 95). Today’s war
economy, on the other hand, is almost entirely the opposite. Belligerents now rely on
the international economy for financial, military, and even logistical support.
Weapons are more likely to be acquired through illicit international means, with few
regions of the world involved in arms manufacturing of any sort. While state armies
still exist, with few exceptions these too rely on globalized markets to acquire the
means to conduct war. More specifically, the large cache of leftover weapons after
the collapse of the Soviet Union, as well the industrial-economic complex that
provided these, have turned to private hands. As a result, there is a privatization of
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violence, as discussed below. The political economy of war in the 21st century is
decentralized, privatized, and no longer bound by territorial borders.

3. Mode of warfare: Moving from the sphere of the political economy to a discussion of
society itself, Kaldor once again discusses the importance of decentralization. While
Modern War was fought between state militaries, the belligerents now are now just as
likely to come from the private sphere, with local warlords, paramilitary groups,
international terrorist organizations, foreign mercenaries, and peacekeepers becoming
players of greater importance. The hierarchical structures that characterized Modern
War no longer occupy a central role in the processes of organized political violence.
The dispersion of the control of violence from the state to non-hierarchical,
networked groups marks a significant shift from Old to New War. In addition, and
once again parallels with the political economy of war are evident, belligerents in
New Wars tend to disregard territorial state borders and are more concerned with
particularistic identities, a reference to the focus on “identity politics” as opposed to
state-based structures.

Kaldor’s work quickly became influential in the IR field, yet a number of critics
contested the empirical validity and historical accuracy of her claims. Siniša Malešević
(2008) nicely summarizes Kaldor’s shortcomings regarding the claimed unprecedented
nature of contemporary conflict. Citing the work of Newman (2004) and Kalvyas (2001
and 2006) Malešević (2008) challenges the proliferation of New War and identifies
previous conflicts where the defining characteristics of New Wars were apparent. Two
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specific criticisms are worth further discussion. First, in response to the notion that wars
are more likely to be about ethno/national rather than political interests and that conflict
is increasingly decentralized, Melander, Oberg, and Hall (2006) as well as Sollenberg
(2007) investigate the impact of wars on civilians. They find that the magnitude of
violence (number of civilian deaths) has declined and the civilian-military death ratio has
remained a constant 50/50. It must be pointed out though that data regarding war
casualties are especially unreliable and Tokaca (2007, cited in Malešević 2008) found the
Yugoslav Wars to have a 59:41 civilian: military death ratio. In the Rwandan genocide,
the ratio was even more skewed toward the civilian side.
From a more theoretical perspective, Kaldor’s tendency to contrapose her theory
of New War opposite only Realist approaches to understanding international conflict
greatly weakens her overall argument. At the risk of oversimplification, we can describe
Realist explanation of war, and specifically war in the 20th century, by starting with the
fundamental assumptions of the analytical framework. While the Realist tradition has
within itself a number of micro-theories, my summation here follows from Kenneth
Waltz’ seminal Man, the State, and War (1959) and Theory of International Politics
(1979). Waltz argues that instead of understanding state behavior as a product of either
human nature or the nature of the state, it is more analytically appropriate to consider the
nature of international politics. Waltz, like Realists before him, sees the sphere in which
states interact as anarchical. In this anarchical system, states seek not power, as
Morgenthau saw it, but security. War, then, is carried out in order to better secure the
state in the order-less system. Seen as such, war is exclusively a public enterprise, carried
out for state interest, by state armies, and against other states.

19

By conflating Old War with Realist inter-state war, Kaldor compromises her own
argument. She argues that decentralized, non-state actors are an unprecedented
component of war, yet historically oriented researchers like Newman (2004) and Kalvyas
(2001) point out the role of decentralized guerrilla tactics in the Chinese communist
revolution and the Vietnam War. There is little that defenders of Kaldor’s original New
War framework can respond with here, as decentralized warfare certainly existed in the
20th century, perhaps not in Realist understandings of war, but certainly in the practice of
violent political conflict the world over. Kaldor’s “Old War” model, biased towards
international war, thus fails to address the existence of intra-state conflict in the 20th
century. Needless to say, not all violence is international, and Kaldor could have
considered placing her New War analysis in the civil war or even sociological field of
study. This is not to say that IR is not the right field for Kaldor, but rather that because
she chose to enter this particular debate, her work is susceptible to criticism from
different academic fields. Her steadfast desire to discuss New War in post-statist terms,
and Old War in exclusively statist terms, weakens her overall argument.
A second and similar major criticism of Kaldor’s work addresses her focus on the
ethnic nature of conflict, once again referring to the idea that identity politics has resulted
in identity-based violence. In an understanding of the international sphere where states
are the fundamental units, it is difficult to fit in ethnic violence, yet this does not mean
such violence is unprecedented. In summarizing Newman’s work, Malešević points out
the obvious ethnic dynamics of violence “registered in genocides of Herreros, Native
Americans, Armenians, or Jews in the Holocaust” (2008, p. 99). Again, Kaldor
fundamentalists would struggle to defend the idea that there is an increased focus on
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national identity in the post-Cold War era. Once more, it seems that Kaldor’s tendency to
juxtapose her theory against a Realist framework is compromising her argument’s
persuasive ability. More importantly though, this particular element of Kaldor’s
framework simply does not stand up to empirical scrutiny.
Despite these legitimate criticisms targeted at the New War framework, the IR
field did not shy away from the idea that the institution of war was undergoing
transformative change. The notion that the institution of warfare was being fundamentally
transformed, at a level beyond the “how and where” of organized political violence,
persisted into the 21st century. There are now few scholars (if any) that subscribe to
Kaldor’s thesis in its original terms. Instead, a broader, more macro-level, socio-historical
approach to understanding war has taken hold.
For example, Herfried Münkler’s The New Wars (2005) uses a comparative
historical method to more specifically map the elements of war affected by globalization.
He concludes, after comparing contemporary war with both modern (1900-1989) and premodern (1600-1900) conflict, that New War is defined by de-statization, autonomization,
and asymmetry. Münkler argues that while previous conflicts led to a strengthening of
state structures, contemporary war tends to result in state decay (de-statization). This is
caused partially through the autonomization of violence – the prevalence and relative
inexpensiveness of weapons, along with the increasing liquidity of financial flows, has
resulted in the creation of conditions where small groups now have the means to carry out
violent conduct. While in all previous eras war became an increasingly expensive
endeavor, the past few decades have seen a rise in the use of small arms, many of which
are leftovers from the Soviet Cold War machinery. Finally, Münkler argues that because
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of de-statization and the autonomization of violence, belligerents are now likely to hold
asymmetrical objectives and means for war. While old wars tended to be fought between
large public armies in the interest of the state, new wars are unlikely to be over statist
concerns. States remain important figures in new wars, but more often than not non-state
actors are just as likely to occupy a central role.
Mark Duffield’s Global Governance and the New Wars (2001), though written
before Münkler’s work, addresses several of the points raised by Münkler and
synthesizes them to produce what is perhaps the most persuasive theoretical
conceptualization of how new wars are fought. More importantly, Duffield gives us
valuable insight regarding the role of global North-South dynamics in the creation and
perpetuation of conflict. He argues that the processes of globalization have
simultaneously excluded much of the global South from the “capitalist core” while
maintaining, “through the spread and deepening of all types of parallel and shadow
transborder activity, …forms of local-global networking and innovative patterns of extralegal and non-formal North-South integration” (Duffield, 2001, p. 5). Duffield thus
argues that new wars are clashes between networks that exist within and across NorthSouth fissures, that transcend local, regional, and national boundaries, that cannot be
separated or criminalized from the mainstream, that have “dissolved the conventional
distinctions between people, army, and government” (Duffield, 2001, p. 190). Ultimately,
Duffield concludes that network wars are existential by nature: “The new wars, as well as
requiring the mobilization of networks to realize wealth and provision violence, are
similarly concerned with restricting the effectiveness of other networks, taking them over
or eliminating them altogether” (Duffield, 2001, p. 190). While Duffield does fall prey to
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some of the same criticisms leveled at Kaldor12, his analysis is nonetheless valuable as it
provides insight into some of the defining antagonisms of the New Wars. The “network
war” framework is a significant step forward in understanding the relationship between
war and globalization.
Ultimately, however, we must deem Duffield’s framework unpersuasive for three
major shortcomings. First, he argues that contemporary conflict can be explained by
examining the development of capitalism in a way that consolidates the “liberal world
order” at the expense of the “Global South”. While such world systems analysis may be
useful, it is misleading to reduce war to materialist considerations. This myopic
understanding of war glosses over other important factors, including its political
dynamic. Along a similar line of reasoning, the second shortcoming in Duffield’s work is
his tendency to criminalize, and thus de-politicize, war. Duffield argues that “violent
conflict is synonymous with various forms of deviant or criminalised activity that result
in social breakdown”, thus marginalizing the political aspect of war (Duffield, 2001, p.
136). This argument fits into Duffield’s larger network framework, as economic and
political considerations are collapsed into one, but there is a risk here in conflating the
concepts of war and crime. Criminal acts do not directly involve a political element, and
while warring networks may have criminal elements, war and crime are not, as Duffield
argues, “synonymous”. Duffield’s final shortcoming is his narrow scope. By focusing on
the merger of the development and security terrains, Duffield ignores other possible
spheres from which organized political violence may emerge. Duffield’s approach allows
Most notably, there is no evidence indicating increased civilian participation or
victimization, the “people, army, government” dynamic existed in previous wars
(Newman, 2004, pp. 184-185), a failure to identify the enormous variation in
contemporary conflict
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incredible insight into wars that spawn out of the merger of development and security, as
evidenced by his Sudan case study, but they cannot explain war in general. More
specifically, Duffield looks at wars that are particular to a certain time and place, and thus
his framework, while extremely useful, does not offer a complete framework to analyze
war.

II. Bauman and Beck: A macro-sociological approach
Zygmunt Bauman (2001) sees globalization in a similar light to Duffield, though
he points out that the contemporary era is but a continuation of capitalism’s development
rather than a decidedly new phenomenon. The contemporary, globalized era of capitalism
is, for Bauman, “sorely distorted, one-sided, and incomplete, suffering the consequences
of blatantly uneven development” (pp. 13-14). To put it differently, there exists a highly
developed global system of market forces and, simultaneously, an underdeveloped and
under-coordinated political and social network of dependent bodies. It is in the “virgin
space” between these networks where Bauman urges us to look in order to understand
contemporary conflict. He adds further nuance to his argument by differentiating between
two types of war – those furthering the processes of globalization and those induced by it.
Globalizing wars are those that expand the reach of global capital and open previously
isolated markets. Somewhat unconvincingly and at the risk of sounding conspiratorial,
Bauman argues that these wars are fought on behalf of a capitalist elite pursuing profit
maximizing interests (the human rights discourse is little more than rhetorical
justification). Globalization induced wars, on the other hand, are in a way more organic.
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They are not a cause of or reaction to globalization but, in Bauman’s words, its “other
face” (Bauman, 2001, p. 19). More specifically, Bauman argues the following:

The paradoxical effect of the globalization of economy is the new and enhanced
significance of place: the more vulnerable the place becomes, the more radically it
is devalued and stripped of its ‘cosiness’ (its feeding and sheltering capacity), the
more it turns (to use Heidegger’s terms) from ‘Zuhanden’ to ‘Vorhanden’, from a
‘given’, a matter-of-fact part of being, into an uncertain, easy to lose and difficult
to gain, stake in the life struggle. It becomes a focus of intense emotions, hopes
and fears which merge into hysteria (p. 19).

The desire to hold on to place in the face of increasing uncertainty is the basis for
globalization induced wars.
This increased uncertainty is, for Ulrich Beck, a defining feature of the
contemporary era, what he calls the “second modernity” Beck chooses his words
carefully and with more purpose than to simply distance himself from theorists of
postmodernism. He argues that we are not in an age beyond or after that of modernity,
but today’s modernity is different from that of the last century. The Darwinian notion of
progress, which led many to believe that the world’s problems could be overcome
through science and rationality, has been challenged by the persistence of poverty and
destitution, and indeed the worsening situation of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa, the
failure of post-colonial societies to develop/industrialize/Westernize, and the continuation
of war and violence in many parts of the world. Consequently, the skeptical eye of the
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modern era has turned on itself, with progress no longer being the driving force of
society. Instead, with the seeming omnipresence of environmental problems, the
unpredictability of terror strikes, and the possibility of modernity-induced disasters,
avoiding risk has become the central concern in this second coming of modernity. Unlike
wars of the Modern Era, which were fought ostensibly for achieving the greater good,
contemporary wars aim to minimize risk. In this “world risk society”, Beck sees the socalled War on Terror as the first war against global risk.
The applicability of the “risk society” framework in understanding contemporary
jihadist violence is not obvious, but it is important to understand that, especially in an
increasingly interconnected world, international context is important to keep in mind.
Acts of terrorism are not exogenous of trends in the West. Understanding global
sociological, political, and economic trends and structures will give us valuable insight
into understanding jihadist violence. A number of scholars argue that looking at the role
of the West in the late- and trans-modern world is especially important as we try and
understand contemporary violence, jihadist or otherwise. Additionally, regardless of
whether or not one is swayed by Dependency theorists, it is difficult to deny the central
role of the United States and Western Europe in the shaping of direct and indirect
structures of global governance.13
Two major critiques have been leveled at these macro, world-sociological
approaches to understanding contemporary conflict; first, the work of Bauman and Beck
G. John Ikenberry’s influential After Victory discusses the creation of international
institutions in the aftermath of major war. His analysis of the post-World War II institutions,
and how they were designed to consolidate American power by adding some
constraints to it is a notable example of such a theory. The end of the Cold War again
saw “the West” victorious, but this time international institutions did not immediately
adjust, indicating the persistence of a relationship where the West generally and the
United States specifically maintain a disproportionally strong position.
13
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is devoid of observed examples. Seeing as the case studies used by Kaldor have been
heavily (and for the most part rightly) criticized for being inaccurate and misleading, it is
essential that a discussion of real world conflicts, and how they differ from old wars, is
undertaken. While both Bauman and Beck make reference to the wars in Iraq and
Afghanistan, neither extensively engages with either conflict. The reader is left to take a
somewhat gargantuan leap of faith and take the author’s word that wars are either
“globalizing”, “globalization induced”, or “against global risk”. Yee Kuang Heng (2006)
and Keith Spence (2005) have used Beck’s framework by using it to analyze,
respectively, the NATO campaign in Kosovo and the U.S. War on Terror. This paper is,
to some extent, a test of the applicability of these macro-level analyses of contemporary
conflict, though the theoretical model examined is different from that proposed by Beck
and Bauman.
A second group of critics argue that nothing about the new wars – neither the
premise (the widely transformative power of globalization) nor anything about the
institution of war – is necessarily new. While these arguments have been alluded to
earlier, they warrant further discussion.
For Rosenberg, globalization theory was a fad of the 1990s and, especially within
the IR sphere, has failed to provide any lasting analytical insight. He conducts his “post
mortem” of globalization from two levels of analysis. First, Rosenberg argues, as a
general social theory, globalization offers nothing that Marxist analysis of capitalism
does not already consider. The greater reach of market forces, increased intensity of
production, and compromised position of the state are all explained by standard Marxist
theories of capitalist expansion. Second, from the level of historical sociology, Rosenberg
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dismisses what he calls a central claim of globalization theory: the diminished capacity of
the state and the simultaneous erosion of sovereignty. The Westphalian system of
understanding states and how they interact, argues Rosenberg, is built on a series of
flawed assumptions. For Rosenberg, and here he quotes Teshke, ‘the myth of 1648’ has
so severely skewed theoretical understandings of IR that theorists have failed to
accurately conceptualize and discuss the relevant ontological units. In more precise
terms, Rosenberg’s preferred system of studying IR would place the role of capital as the
centerpiece of analysis, rather than assume state sovereignty in anarchical conditions.
With this alternative framework, the belief of globalization theorists that international
politics was being transformed to a post-Westphalian system becomes almost irrelevant.
It is important to seriously consider Rosenberg’s critique of globalization theory
as it forces a deeper and more theoretically precise explanation of the phenomenon.
Rosenberg’s overarching argument, that globalization must be understood in broader
historical terms, is compelling, but it does not deny the unprecedented increase in global
interdependence and interconnectedness during the last few decades. Rosenberg’s
assertion, that globalization is an extension of capitalism, does not invalidate the
argument that social structures are indeed undergoing transformative change. Scholars
such as Bauman and Beck acknowledge this argument and discuss globalization not as an
unprecedented historical event but rather as the continuation of processes that have
continued at least since the Enlightenment and the advent of “modernity.
In his cleverly titled 2005 essay “Premature Obituaries: A Response to Justin
Rosenberg”, Jan Aart Scholte recognizes the value in Rosenberg’s critique of
globalization, but argues that his work is likely to sharpen and expand rather than
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eliminate the use of globalization theory in the social sciences. Scholte empirically
demonstrates that, contrary to what Rosenberg claims, there has been no slowdown in
global financial integration, “nor has globalization receded from academic and policy
agendas” (Scholte, 2005, p. 392). From a theoretical level, contrary to Rosenberg’s claim
that globalization can be understood entirely as a contemporary manifestation of
capitalism, Scholte argues that non-Marxists do offer analytical insight into society and
sociology. He gives us the following example: “non-Marxist social psychologists might
suggest that the geography of communication (e.g. face-to-face vs. cyberspace) impacts
on interpersonal relationships in ways that are not merely a function of capitalist
development” (Scholte, 2005, p. 393). Ultimately, while taking Rosenberg’s argument
seriously, the widespread acceptance of globalization in both academic and lay circles is
justified.
Scholte’s point on Marxist theory does, however, apply to Bauman as well.
Bauman’s analysis of war is undiluted in its materialist focus – he considers the flows
and distribution of capital to be of paramount significance. Thus he too falls prey to
Scholte’s point that other forces, for example new geographies of communication, must
be taken seriously. Examining wars as socially embedded institutions, it is too simple to
reduce political violence to a response, consequence, or side-effect of economic factors
alone.

The second major macro-sociological critique mentioned above, that
contemporary war contains no historically unprecedented features, fails to stand up to
scrutiny. The argument made by proponents of this thesis is well represented in the work
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of Malešević, who concedes that the historical structures within which war has fought
have changed, but the institution of war remains fundamentally untransformed. For
Malešević, even though “the historical setting of the post-World War II world has
substantially transformed the traditional geopolitical goals of nation-states …both at the
national and especially at the international level”, war is still about geopolitical interest.
Here, Malešević appears to be conflating the unchanging character of war with the
mutable nature of war. While reading Malešević alerts us to the importance of clearly
distinguishing between those features of war that are immutable and those that are not,
we are nonetheless left to conclude that the broader New War argument must be taken
seriously.
To add further, in line with previous theorists, I also consider war to be socially
embedded. That is, war is always contextual across time (history) and space (geography).
With the vast majority of social theorists agreeing that we are witnessing historically
unprecedented “time-space compression” in the era of globalization, it follows that the
socially embedded institution of war must also be transformed.
Beck and Bauman, in their larger scholarship and in writing discussed above,
have persuasive understandings of globalization in general, yet their theorization of war
is unconvincing. There is a major failure in that both fail to address or even recognize the
complexity of war. For Bauman, war is simply globalizing or globalization induced,
while Beck fits war too easily into his risk framework. While it may be unfair to expect
socio-philosophers like Bauman and Beck to provide a satisfying conceptualization of
war, ultimately that is what we are after. As discussed in the previous chapter, war cannot
be dealt with as a monolithic whole – there are important distinctions between the
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warfighting paradigm, the social mode of warfare, and the historical structure of war.
These units of analysis will be discussed below in more detail, but with our basic
understanding of these concepts from the introduction, it is evident that both Bauman and
Beck are most concerned with the historical structure of war. The warfighting paradigm,
which tells us how wars are actually fought, and the social mode of warfare, which
considers the role of broader social institutions in planning for and conducting war, are
largely ignored.
A further point can be made regarding the somewhat clumsy universalization of
Beck and Bauman’s framework. The centrality of risk and risk management in the West
has been well documented, and Shaw (2005), Spence (2005), and Heng (2007) have all
used the risk framework to understand Western war. Shaw (2005), who takes Beck’s
work seriously, goes as far as to suggest that risk-transfer is not a central principle in the
“national-militarist”, “ethnic-nationalist”, and “terrorist” ways of war (pp. 62-63).
Bauman’s conceptualization of war is broader and his globalization/globalization-induced
framework can be applied more generally than Beck’s risk theory. Yet Bauman’s
economism remains a fatal flaw and universalizes a particular motivation for war. The
notion of globalizing war, for example, seems to paint an overly greedy, almost demonic,
picture of Western capitalist networks. Even if one is convinced by this portrayal,
Bauman does not do enough to establish the universality of this model. The same applies
to the idea of globalization-induced wars, which may be a more globally applicable
model but without more detail would require a large leap of faith from the reader. To sum
up, Bauman and Beck offer noteworthy analyses of the historical structure of war in the
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current era, but their treatment of war as a monolithic, universal institution ultimately
leaves their theorization incomplete.

Thus far, the literature discussed fails to offer a theoretical model through which it
is possible to analyze the transformation of war. While Kaldor provides a useful
description of New Wars, she does not adequately theorize globalization, resulting in an
analysis that is empirically rich but ultimately unsatisfying as it fails to address how and
why globalization resulted in the transformation of war. To paraphrase Rosenberg,
Kaldor’s work seems to reflect rather than explain the advent of New War. Duffield’s
theorization of globalization is far more satisfying, but he is concerned with the specific
subset of war that results from the merger of development and security, and thus his
framework cannot be applied more broadly. While the notion of “network war” is a
useful analytical tool, in order to apply his framework to contemporary jihadist violence
we must first develop his theories further. Beck and Bauman are exemplars of
globalization theorists. Their work, both the specific pieces discusses here as well as their
broader projects, forms a convincing framework regarding both the depth and the scope
of globalization. War, however, remains frustratingly under-theorized, and their
discussion stays away from discussing the transformation of war. Thus we need to look
at works that both adequately theorize globalization and provide a framework for
analyzing the transformation of war. A complete theory on the transformation of war, for
Andrew Latham, “needs to be integrated into a broader framework that reconnects
changes in the nature of warfighting to both broader changes in the social organization of
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warfare and deeper changes in the nature of was as an historically constructed social
institution” (2002, p. 233).

III. Shaw and Latham: Theorizing global war, transformation, and history
Martin Shaw, in his 2005 book The New Western Way of War, seeks to illustrate “the
relationships between ways of warfighting, military organization, and social and political
structures” (p. 29). He is focused on the West, yet he immediately acknowledges that
before elaborating on “the New Western Way of War”, it is necessary to discuss a global
mode of warfare, even though this may seem counterintuitive at first. Since military
campaigns carried out by the West are generally targeted at the non-West and because of
the already identified processes of globalization, “there is an overriding case” to
“conceptualize Western and non-Western warfare together” (Shaw, 2005, p. 47). In
addition, Shaw engages extensively with what David Held et al. call military
globalization, a phenomenon characterized by “the worldwide reach of great power
rivalry, the development of a global arms dynamic, and the expansion of global
governance of military affairs” (Shaw, 2005, p. 48).
Given the above, Shaw proceeds to describe the transition to the global mode of war
in the post-Cold War era. He highlights three key occurrences. First, there has been a
worldwide transition “from direct to indirect mass mobilization” (p. 55). This shift from
large, centrally organized military units to smaller, decentralized, informal, and
underground ones has been made possible by “the Internet, by distributing videotapes and
penetrating mass-media coverage” (p. 55). Second, the “general relationship between
warfighting and the political, economic, and cultural-ideological domains” has changed,
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resulting in war moving from a dominant to a subordinate position with respect to
society. Unlike industrialized total war of the 20th century, war “cannot override social
relations as fully or widely as total war could” (p. 55). Finally, Shaw argues that in
contemporary war, belligerents must reckon with “the comprehensive military
surveillance of their military ventures by global state institutions, law, markets, media,
and civil society” (p. 56). Shaw is making the argument that New War is affected by
‘New’, or globalized, politics, economics, and media.
Shaw’s framework is strengthened by his discussion of “segmented globality”, as this
allows him to address how surveillance applies differently in different contexts.
Globalization does not, for Shaw, result in the creation of an undifferentiated global
socio-cultural whole. Different societal variables affect war differently. For example,
Shaw argues that while conflicts around the world may be checked by a trans-national
political economy, it is likely that the surveillance of civil society is more critical on the
West than on other actors. Through his discussion of segmented globality, Shaw ends up
with four “ways of war” – Western, national-militarist, ethnic-nationalist, and terrorist (p.
60). His focus is on the first of the four, and his discussion of global terrorism is
ultimately underdeveloped and must be judged unpersuasive. In addition, while Shaw
provides us with a worthwhile theorization of the transition to a global mode of war, he
does not isolate and discuss the different historical layers from which war must be
analyzed. To be more precise, Shaw’s framework is a hodgepodge of variables, and, as
discussed by Latham, it may be possible to more accurately discuss the transformation of
war if we can distinguish between different levels at which this transformation is
occurring.
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Writing first in response to works on the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA), but
then in reaction to the “Transformation of War” debate in general, Latham (2002, 2008,
forthcoming) discusses the implications of the tendency of the literature to be
“historically myopic”. While authors like Beck, Bauman, and Duffield have made some
efforts to treat globalization as a historically continuous process, the causal relationship
between the transformation of war as a result of world order transformation remains
under-theorized. Latham argues that what is needed is a Braudelian approach to
understanding how historical processes have affected the institution of war. The central
role of Braudelian history in this paper warrants further discussion of the theory,
especially as used by Latham.
French historian Fernand Braudel, a seminal thinker in the Annales school of
historiography, suggests that history should be conceptualized through three temporal
lenses. Latham (2002) provides us with both a succinct summary of Braudel’s framework
as well as suggestions on how it may be applied to the study of New War. We begin with
Braudel. First, at the level of l’histoire évenméntielle, is the series of events that comprise
daily life. This may be better understood as “events-time” or “journalistic time” and
consists of events that regularly take place at a small scale. Second, the broader and
deeper idea of the conjuncture, a series of events that can be understood as episodes.
Conjunctural time thus deals with historical periods, with examples being Romanticism,
the Industrial Revolution, or World War II (Braudel as quoted in Latham, 2002). The
conjuncture can last for periods of time that may vary from a few years (like World War
II) to a few decades (the Industrial Revolution), but is defined by a certain identifiable
and, to some extent, generalizable set of socioeconomic norms, principles, and
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expectations. Finally, the broadest of the temporal lenses is that of the longue durée,
which looks at history from a perspective wider still than the conjuncture, and examines
the politics, cultures, and mentalities of a time. Thus, argues Latham, a social scientist
using the lens of the longue durée “is less concerned with mere events or even mediumterm episodes than with the evolution of fundamental social structures that assume a
quasi-permanent character” (Latham, 2002, p. 235).
Latham then reads Braudel against Clausewitz to identify and conceptually isolate the
various facets of the character of war, that is, those attributes of organized violence that
are susceptible to change, in each of the historical units. Here, he makes the critical
contribution of identifying the difference between the warfighting paradigm, the social
mode of warfare, and the historical structure of war. These three units are analogous to,
respectively, l’histoire évenméntielle, conjunctural time, and the longue durée.
Latham then goes a step further, describing how each of the three analytical lenses,
the warfighting paradigm, the social mode of warfare, and the historical structure of war,
can be used to understand the RMA. The RMA, however, was a predominantly Western
development, and Latham’s work does not address the global nature of changes in the
character of war. For example, Latham identifies “precision destruction” as a defining
feature of the warfighting paradigm in the current era, and indeed for technologically
advanced state militaries this seems to be the case, but it is difficult to see this as a central
characteristic of contemporary war in general. It seems necessary, therefore, to synthesize
the works of Latham and Shaw, to take history seriously and to address segmented
globality.
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IV. Conclusion
There is no doubt that New War theory has come a long way since Kaldor first
introduced the concept. We are now at a point where we can build a framework that can
describe and, more importantly, explain how globalization has transformed the institution
of war. In Kaldor, Duffield, and Münkler, we have exceptionally rich descriptions of how
New Wars are fought. Bauman and Beck tell us the (changing) role of war in society.
Shaw then explains military globalization and the segmented nature of globality, allowing
us to create a model where the way in which wars are fought differs across space, even
though there are universal underlying characteristics. Finally, Latham provides a
framework through which we can map the ways in which war as a socially imbedded
institution has been transformed as a result of globalization. In the following chapter, I
combine Latham’s Braudelian model with Shaw’s understanding of segmented globality
to create a theoretical framework that explains the transformation of war through
globalization.
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THREE

Theorizing War and Globalization

Toward the end of the second millennium of the Christian Era several events of historical
significance have transformed the social landscape of human life. A technological
revolution, centered around information technologies, is reshaping, at an accelerated
pace, the material basis of society. Economics throughout the world have become
globally interdependent, introducing a new form of relationship between economy, state
and society…
-

Manuel Castells

In this chapter, I provide a theoretical framework from which we may understand the
transformation of war as a result of globalization processes. The literature discussed thus
far has provided us with important analytical insights into both war and globalization, and
in this chapter I hope to build on the work of Martin Shaw and Andrew Latham to reach
an understanding of contemporary war that adequately theorizes globalization and
explains how this phenomenon has led to the transformation of war. My aim is to create a
model that understands the difference between that which is being explained (war) and
that doing the explaining (globalization), and engages with the different temporal levels
at which both war and globalization function. While the general model provided by
Latham is applicable to any historical transformation in the institution of war, I apply his
archetype to the present era.
This chapter is divided into two parts. First, I discuss in some more detail Shaw’s idea
of a segmented globality introduced in the previous chapter. In line with Shaw, I argue
that it makes sense to speak of a “global” mode of war, while understanding that
important distinctions still exist. Second, I elaborate on Latham’s suggested approach,
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using three distinct temporal lenses. I discuss the warfighting paradigm and the social
mode of warfare with a focus on the contemporary era. While I discuss the historical
structure of war, I refrain from commenting on contemporary transformations as they are
difficult to identify and, without the benefit of hindsight, difficult if not impossible to
analyze.
Before proceeding further, two reminders are in order. First is to recall from the
introductory chapter the distinction between the unchanging nature of war and its mutable
character. In discussing the transformation of war, I am referring specifically to the
character of organized political conflict. Second, along a similar vein, is the treatment of
war as a socially embedded, rather than socio-historically aberrational, phenomenon. War
is not treated as distinct from the day to day functioning of contemporary global society
but rather as deeply intertwined within world order.

I. Globalization and a Segmented Globality
A common understanding of the present era is that globalization leads to two
extremes – increased tribalism, characterized by a focus on particularized identities, and
unrestrained homogenization through the hegemonic permeation of “Western” culture.
Benjamin Barber (1992) labeled this attractively simple understanding of globalization
“Jihad vs. McWorld”, and the idea that opposing social forces were dictating
contemporary world order gained steam throughout the 1990s. It is impossible to argue
against the notion that there exist both tribalist and globalist strains in today’s world, yet
it is also flawed to suggest, as Barber does, that these are “the two axial principles of our
age”. If we are to take the idea of globalization seriously, then we must accept that there
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is a generalizable, rather than contradictory, social force that is affecting change
throughout the world. Through this transformative social force, we should then be able to
understand both the reversion to particularistic identities and the emergence of a global
identity, which Shaw (2000) defines as “a common consciousness of human society on a
world scale” (p. 12).14
For Shaw, writing in the context of understanding war, the transformative social force
that has been emerged worldwide has been surveillance. He writes:

States and other armed actors must make war work in political, economic, and
cultural as well as strictly military terms. Wars must play much more by the rules
of politics, markets and media: warmaking must capitalize on market relations,
exploit political forms, and manage, media. In the end, armed actors must reckon
not so much with global governance…but with comprehensive surveillance of
their military ventures by global state institutions, law, markets, media, and civil
society. The best way of characterizing the new mode of war as a whole is
therefore global surveillance war. (Shaw, 2005, pp. 55-56)

Shaw then demonstrates that surveillance works in different ways in different sociocultural settings, with different surveillance mechanisms being important in different
parts of the world. While developing in an increasingly global world, the force of
surveillance still encounters local power structures, economic systems, cultural practices

This definition is vastly different from Barber’s, but as I have defined globalization in far
broader strokes, I think it is only appropriate to move on from his overly economistic
understanding of the phenomenon

14
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and other variables, and as a result creates several distinct ways of war. Thus, argues
Shaw, it makes sense to speak of a segmented globality.
On the whole, Shaw’s argument is persuasive, that the transformative social force of
globalization encounters local structural realities and thus results in different
manifestations of war. Surveillance, however, is too specific a phenomenon – it would be
difficult to argue that it is the defining element of our present era.
Instead, a broader and more recognizable force, that of time-space compression, will
serve us well as we seek to conceptualize globalization. Coined by David Harvey, timespace compression is not an unprecedented social force, indeed he considers it to be a
constant through the history of capitalism yet the scale and scope at which it is taking
place at present has never before been witnessed. More specifically, time-space
compression is now planetary in scale and has led to the decreased significance of
distance. This decreased significance of distance, and the consequent wider reach of
power, is what I consider to be the most important transformative force of globalization.
What does this mean for a global theory of war? In line with Shaw’s argument, given
the reduced significance of distance, it makes sense to speak of a global mode of war. A
cursory glance at some of today’s major warzones – Iraq, Afghanistan, Sudan, Sri Lanka
– indicates the presence of worldwide networks. These networks deal in financial,
military, ideological, and technological terms and expand across the globe. Thus
increasingly war takes place “within the same environments: the same zones of war, the
social and political spaces in which armed force is used, and a global political-military
environment” (Shaw, 2005, pp. 53-54).
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At the same time, as discussed above, time-space compression and global networks
collide everywhere with local structures. Power hierarchies, military complexes,
economic systems and several other social variables vary across space, and thus we must
speak of a segmented globality. Thus from this point on, when discussing the warfighting
paradigm, the social mode of warfare, or the historical structure of war, I will assume a
segmented globality, a condition where the global social force of time-space compression
interacts with different ground realities.

II. A Braudelian Model to Understand War
Understanding large historical transformation is no easy task. While it is somewhat
easier to describe characteristics of contemporary war, it is harder to explain how
particular characteristics have appeared. Fortunately, as discussed in the previous chapter,
Braudel has given us the tools to theorize and thus explain large historical processes. To
understand and explain socio-historical transformation, we are advised to look at our
subject (war and globalization in this case) from the temporal vantage points of l’histoire
évenméntielle, conjunctural time, and the longue durée. Latham’s reading of Clausewitz
against Braudel provides us with the concepts of the warfighting paradigm, the social
mode of warfare, and the historical structure of war. In this section, I first elaborate on
the three layers at which war is analyzed and then discuss how globalization has had a
transformative effect on each.
Before proceeding further, it is important to acknowledge that there are significant
overlaps across the three units of analyzing war mentioned above. Technology, for
example, is most directly discussed under the warfighting paradigm, yet colossal shifts in
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technology may directly affect the social mode of warfare. Along a slightly different line
of reasoning, there are also causal overlaps across the three units of analysis. A change in
the social mode of warfare may lead to new warfighting paradigm, and the reverse
relationship could also arise. Thus it is important to point out that while the warfighting
paradigm, the social mode of warfare, and the historical structure of war are here treated
as distinct units, the real life manifestations of the three are not discrete.

A. Globalization and the Warfighting Paradigm
The events-time mode of inquiry is most concerned with the descriptive elements
of a social phenomenon, and it is no surprise that l’histoire évenméntielle is often called
“journalistic” time. The warfighting paradigm thus refers to the way in which opposing
groups engage in violence. Latham describes it as the “specific configuration of military
technologies, doctrines, and organizational forms” (Latham, 2002, p. 236). Weapons and
technology occupy a key role in discussing the warfighting paradigm, but the concept
also importantly includes a role for human agents.
A different way to think of the warfighting paradigm is to consider it the
“battlefield” aspect of war. Battlefield engagements have changed over time, for example
from “the static attritional form of warfighting emblematic of the First World War to the
combined arms manoeuvre approach to warfighting that characterized the Second World
War” (Latham, forthcoming). Today, through processes of globalization, the battlefield
can no longer be thought of as a bounded place where enemies engage in combat but
rather as a more unidentifiable and unpredictable space where violence may break out.
This is not to say that traditional battlefields no longer exist, or that “the world is a
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battlefield”, but rather that because of the growing asymmetry in and autonomization of
war, along with the increasing significance of network societies, wars are fought in what
Bauman calls the “virgin spaces” between networks.
The unprecedented scale and scope of time-space compression in the
contemporary era has led to what Herfried Münkler has labeled the autonomization of
violence and a consequent asymmetry in warfighting that seemed to be disappearing
during the Modern period. To understand this point further, rich, descriptive works on the
transformation of war are most relevant. The previously discussed projects of Münkler
and Mark Duffield in particular are useful in explaining the transformation in the
warfighting paradigm from the late modern Cold War to the post-Cold War era. Münkler
considers the disappearance of the piece of land known as the battlefield to be a result of
the asymmetry that characterizes New War. He argues that since belligerents are no
longer evenly matched, “there are no longer war fronts and…few actual engagements and
no major battles” (p. 3). While wars in the high-modern era were conducted by armies
that looked similar (though not identical), the availability of cheap weapons and
improvements in communication and financial technologies have resulted in the creation
of a number of warfighting units that look nothing like Modern armies. Thus wars are
fought by state, non-state, and semi-state armies, paramilitary units, warlords, and
mercenary groups. Münkler labels this spawning of new violence producing units the
autonomization of war. Autonomization has created different types of warmaking units,
which battle each other in asymmetric wars.
Autonomization and asymmetry are deeply interrelated concepts that characterize
the warfighting paradigm of the contemporary era. Both are products of globalization.
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More specifically, as Kaldor details, the increased magnitude and velocity of trade in
weapons has meant that almost anyone anywhere can become armed. Previously
antagonistic groups have now become violently antagonistic. The collapsed Soviet Union
left not only a large stockpile of weapons but also a military industrial complex that
suddenly lost its only customer. While several of the weapon-making factories collapsed,
others landed in private hands and switched to producing light, cheap weapons. It is these
arms that have reached violent factions around the world creating new actors that
participate in asymmetrical warfare. At the same time, the development of technologies
of “precision destruction” in the West has exacerbated the asymmetrical nature of
contemporary conflict (Latham, 2002, p. 237). The classic image of recent conflicts may
be the AK-47 and a $400 Russian 82mm Mortar armed fighter being targeted by the $40
million Predator Drone.
Mark Duffield (2001) makes an important further contribution in theorizing the
contemporary warfighting paradigm. While Münkler and Kaldor talk about the role of the
globalized economy, Duffield also implicates actors and organizations that are not
directly involved in conflict, creating a model of network war. For Duffield, it no longer
makes sense to think of armed units as the only relevant actors when discussing
organized political violence. Instead, he suggests considering all those actors that are
implicated in warfighting networks, including “governments, NGOs, militaries, and the
business sector” (p. 13). This idea of network war takes us beyond warfighting
considerations and thus serves as an appropriate transition to the discussion of the social
mode of warfare.
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B. Globalization and the Social Mode of Warfare
Looking at war through the temporal lens of the conjuncture, the social mode of
warfare comes into focus. Broader than the battlefield, the social mode of warfare
examines “the complex of social, economic, and deep technological forces that shape the
way in which a society wages war” (Latham, 2002, p. 241, my emphasis). Processes of
time-space compression have resulted in a transformation in the way societies organize
for and implement war. Held and McGrew (2007), Shaw (2005), and Latham (2002) have
identified the social mode of warfare through most of the 20th century as one of
Industrialized Total War, a complex that “demanded or threatened the complete
mobilization or destruction of societies” (Held & McGrew, 2007, p. 52) and relied on the
combination of “mass mobilization-mass production-mass destruction” (Latham, 2002, p.
247). Kaldor adds that the 20th century mode of warfare resulted in war economies that
were fiercely internalized. States were the major war making units and the entire process
of organized violence – from the creation and distribution of weapons to the training of
soldiers and the eventual combat itself – rarely saw input from foreign actors.
Globalization has fundamentally transformed this model into one that is
characterized by networks that are mobile, fluid, flexible, and often transnational, even
global. Duffield’s model builds on the idea of network society popularized by Manuel
Castells in the first of his three volume magnum opus The Information Age (1996).
Castells first discusses the central role of technology in societal structure, noting that
“technology does not determine society: it embodies it. But neither does society
determine technological innovation: it uses it” (Castells, 1996, p. n5). In the
contemporary era, through time-space compression in general but the spread of
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information technology in particular, Castells argues that the spatially dispersed network,
rather than the territorially contained state or mass of individuals, has come to become
the basic unit of society.
Building on this notion of networks, Duffield builds a model that convincingly
explains organized violence in what he calls the Global South. Duffield argues that since
the end of the Colonial period, networks linking actors in the Global North have
strengthened along economic, political, technological and military lines. Simultaneously,
while formal networks across the North-South divide remain relatively less formal, they
have nevertheless expanded through illicit and mostly illegal “shadow economic activity”
(Duffield, 2001, p. 8). Flowing from the North to the South, on the other hand, “the
networks of international policy have thickened and multiplied their points of
engagement and control” (Duffield, 2001, p. 8). The complex ways in which these many
networks interact has resulted in an environment where “the networks that support war
cannot easily be separated out and criminalized in relation to the networks that
characterize peace” (Duffield, 2001, p. 190) – both weapons and aid come through the
same lines. The distinctions between government, financial institutions, militaries, and
citizens has evaporated, leaving only networks that, again referring back to Castells, form
the basic unit of society.
Network wars are thus fought not just by armed groups but by entire economic,
political, and cultural networks. Because the end goal of such wars is to replace one
network with another, they tend to be existential in nature. Along a similar line of
reasoning, Bauman introduces the notion of globalizing war – that is, wars that are
conducted “in the name of the not yet existent but postulated ‘international community’,
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represented in practice by ad-hoc, mostly regional coalition of interested partners”
(Bauman, 2002, p. 14). We can easily replace the phrase “coalition of interested partners”
above with “networks” to create a different piece in the puzzle of the social mode of
warfare in a segmented globality.
So far, I have argued that network war is emblematic of the contemporary social
mode of warfare and discussed how this form of war manifests itself in the Global South
and among capitalist elites, presumably in the North. Citing Shaw (2005), Held and
McGrew (2007) add to the analysis, noting that in the West war is “conducted by largely
demilitarized societies with limited objectives and precision force” (p. 52). Noting that
since societies everywhere are increasingly dependent on global modes of production,
disrupting networks rather than destroying enemies is a key objective. Thus not just
military but all kinds of social activity – political, economic, cultural – may be either
implicated or targeted in New War.
A final note on the social mode of warfare regarding the role of ideas is in order.
While traditional political science has tended to submit little explanatory power to
agency, it is evident that in this era of globalization the power of ideas has increased
manifold. To expand further, through advances in information technology, a much greater
amount of information is created and distributed. This information is instantaneously
affected by real world events at the local, regional, and global level. While ideas
previously began in local environs and then, if they were deemed noteworthy, expanded
beyond, today creators of ideas have a much broader base from which to find adherents.
The globalization of the local and the localization of the global has led to the increased
influence and pervasiveness of ideas. This instantly morphed, globally informed, globally

48

distributed information has had a key role in the successes of the environmental
movement, in the organization of anti-globalization protests, and, as we shall see later, in
the creation and then permeation of globalist jihadist violence.
To summarize, through time-space compression processes the Modern and Late
Modern system of spatially contained mass organization has been replaced by a globally
dispersed system where traditional distinctions between social sectors are no longer as
clear. In the contemporary moment, networks that expand across local, national, regional,
and global spaces and encompass all forms economic, political, cultural and military
activities have become the fundamental units of social organization. Wars are fought not
between armed units but by, around, and through entire networks, though the way
networks manifest themselves globally depends on local conditions. Networks have also
been a powerful source, inspiration, and medium of distribution for ideas, which are now
globally created and distributed.
The significance of network society is evident at the level of the conjuncture, and
the contemporary moment is best understood as a different episode from that of the Cold
War era. But is it appropriate to speak of even deeper structural changes in world order
and consequent transformations in the institution of war?
C. Globalization and the Historical Structure of War
Globalization and the advent of network society have come to define the
contemporary episode, but it is unclear that structures that constitute world order have
been definitively redefined. Despite trends within academic spheres, I am unconvinced
that we have reached the “post-modern” age, primarily because, as discussed at length by
Justin Rosenberg and Ulrich Beck, capitalism, though a different kind than that of the
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industrial age, remains the central organizing principle of social organization.
Furthermore, given the irrelevance of some of the early predictions of globalization (the
end of sovereignty, the permanent dominance of the United States, the end of mankind’s
ideological evolution), one has to be especially careful when treading the path of deep,
structural or systemic analysis.
Nonetheless, looking at the longue durée remains an analytically useful tool and it
must be discussed here with regard to war. The longue durée allows us to study war not
just as a social, political, economic, or military phenomenon, but as a constitutive
element of world order. In slightly different words, examining the historical structure of
war begins to answer the “big questions” of the ontological meaning and purpose of war
in any given historical moment. In this section, I will describe the concept of the
historical structure of war and then offer some preliminary insights into how
globalization may be transforming this unit of analysis.
Latham considers the historical structure of war to consist of “the cluster of
deeply embedded cultural rules, discourses and practices that determine the locus of
control of organized violence, define the nature and purposes of war, and that ultimately
set war apart from other forms of politics and violence” (Latham, 2002, p. 247). With
analytical lens, we are beginning to encroach on the nature of war, its trans-historical
elements that define what war means. Latham specifies further that the historical
structure of war is made up of three structural elements – the constitutive antagonisms of
world order, the political architecture of organized violence, and the institution of war.
The constitutive antagonisms of world order refer to “fundamental configurations
of violently conflictual social forces within a given world order” (Latham, forthcoming).
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Latham uses “social force” differently than I have above, using the term to refer to
discernible organized groups that pursue some reasonably generalizable objective.
Importantly, these social forces are the constitutive units of world order – they are the
“defining… social relations underpinning global political life” (Latham, forthcoming).
Each group will pursue some combination of material and non-material aims, and some
of these will likely be hostile or contradictory, creating the conditions of possibility for
war. In the contemporary era, the rise of network society can be understood as the
emergence of new social forces, but not necessarily new constitutive antagonisms.
Has globalization altered the constitutive antagonisms of world order? It is
difficult to say, especially within the framework of a segmented globality. In the West,
there is considerable evidence and scholarship to suggest that risk has become a central
antagonistic force and a constitutive element of world order. Beck’s idea of risk society
discusses the management of modernity induced risk to be a central organizing principle
of society. He argues that in world risk society, “risks have become a major force of
political mobilization, often replacing references to, for example, inequalities associated
with class, race, and gender” (Beck, World Risk Society, 1999, p. 4). Shaw builds on this
idea, arguing that transferring risk is the central tenet of the Western way of war (Shaw,
2005). Yet Beck himself is hesitant to label the current moment as postmodern and
prefers the terminology of the second modernity. For Beck, risk occupies a central role in
social structures as a result of modernity’s skeptical eye turning on itself. The major risks
Beck identifies – environmental degradation, global terrorism, poverty etc – continue to
be addressed through state based mechanisms. There is reason to continue to critically
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analyze possible transformations in the constitutive antagonisms of world order, but it
seems premature to conclusively judge them at present.
The second structural element of the historical structure of war is the political
architecture of organized violence, which Latham defines as “the historically specific
ensemble of war-making within any given world order and the structural or systemic
‘matrix’ within which those units are embedded” (forthcoming). Somewhat more
specifically, this involves looking at the role of warmaking units and systems within the
larger social order. Here, we can more clearly see the transformative effects of
globalization, though again it is important to qualify any talk of large scale structural
transformations. As networks erode the organizational principle of the mass (which
manifests itself in territorially bound units like the state or the industrial factory), we
begin to see the emergence of a new political architecture of organized violence. War can
no longer be discussed as a specific form of mass organization and mobilization. It is
instead a conflict between networks – territorially dispersed yet ideationally united,
combining the political, the economic, the cultural, and the militant, functioning within a
social order that doesn’t consist of other similar looking mass actors but rather very
different looking networks. The ways in which networks interact is not through hierarchy
but rather through decentralized and interspersed mechanisms. Networks often have no
individual or group at the helm and therefore lines of interaction (material or social)
across networks are multiple and dispersed.
It is important, however, to not overstate the significance of the network. The
state, the most important of all modern warmaking units, maintains its central role in
contemporary world order. The difference now is that the political architecture of
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organized violence consists not just of the states but rather of complex networks of which
the state is an important node. It is also important to remember that transformations in the
political architecture of war occur at different speeds in different places. Mass units
remain more important in some parts of the world and the relative importance of certain
nodes in networks varies across space. Yet the emergence of the network as a
fundamental warmaking unit is strong evidence that globalization has had a significant
transformative impact on the historical structure of war.
The final structural element of the historical structure of war is the institution of
war itself, that is “the prevailing set of socially constructed beliefs regarding the
ontology, (moral) purpose and meaning of war that is enacted and expressed in any given
historical setting” (Latham, forthcoming). The purpose of war and its ontological
significance are determined largely by the constitutive antagonisms and political
architecture of world order. Here we reach perhaps the murkiest of all territory covered
thus far, especially given that I take time-space variation seriously in the segmented
globality model. The purpose of war varies significantly across time and space, and to
comment on either its legitimacy or its ontological significance is perhaps a task more
suited to philosophers than political scientists. Nonetheless, we can refer once again to
Beck and his model of risk society to try and understand the contemporary institution of
war.
War against risk, risk-transfer war as Shaw calls it, defines the contemporary
western way of war. Yet it is more than a definition – limiting unpredictability and
fighting to prevent the unexpected seem to be becoming the moral purpose of war.
Considering the early 21st century military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq as part of
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the war against terror, Beck argues that “the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq were a novelty,
because they were the first wars against global risk” (2005, p. 19). Beck argues that the
wars were considered legitimate because they attacked a global risk, yet the assertion that
these wars were considered morally desirable is certainly problematic. The Iraq War, in
particular, faced mass opposition even before military operations began (McFadden,
2003). Similarly, humanitarian war, another mode of organized violence that some argue
is legitimate, has faced a number of detractors. It might be that with the critical self
reflection characteristic of the second modern age, “moral legitimacy” no longer applies
to war.

III. Conclusion
In this chapter, I first described the notion of a segmented globality where the central
axis around which local factors rotate is that of time-space compression. As a result, the
network has started to replace the territorially contained mass as the central organizing
unit of social structure. Networks transcend traditional borders across space and blur
distinctions between different areas of social life – the political, economic, cultural, and
military can no longer be discussed in discrete terms. The emergence of networks and
unprecedented time-space compression in a segmented globality provide the point of
departure for my theory of the transformation of war.
War is analyzed from three temporal perspectives - l’histoire évenméntielle,
conjunctural time, and the longue durée. For each, an explanation of the effects of
globalization on respective structural elements is provided. Networks again emerge as
central explanatory variables. Globalization is shown to have a significant transformative
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impact on the warfighting paradigm and the social mode of warfare, though the effects on
the historical structure of war are somewhat more ambiguous.
Does this theory of globalization and the transformation of war stand up to scrutiny?
In order to answer this question, I use the theoretical framework discussed here to explain
perhaps the most significant manifestation of organized political conflict facing the world
– globalist jihadist violence.
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FOUR

Globalist Jihadist Violence

“Borders and frontiers are no longer territorial. There is no wall defending the enemy,
an enemy that is more often than not too elusive to be named and targeted, an enemy who
if he is shadowy is sometimes merely our shadow.”
-

Olivier Roy

The outpouring of literature in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks (though in all
fairness there were notable contributions before 2001 as well) has attempted to explain
this contemporary jihadist violence in a number of ways: some saw it as the continuation
of Islam’s inherently imperialistic ambitions, others saw a “clash of civilizations”, while
many were persuaded by the notion that material conditions were to blame. Recognizing
that there is no simple explanation for the phenomenon is an important step. A
mechanical cause-and-effect explanation will always provide only an incomplete picture
as there is no one trigger that has suddenly inspired Muslims to become holy warriors;
attempting to identify such a factor is an exercise in futility. The theoretical model
offered in the previous chapter allows for a more organic, yet nonetheless persuasive,
explanation of this conflict. It should be noted, though, that the focus is more on
explaining the what and how of globalist jihad and less on why.
This chapter begins with a discussion of the warfighting paradigm in the
contemporary jihadist movement. Following Braudel’s advice, sources used are
journalistic and specific events are discussed. The evidence is strong that globalization
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and jihadist warfighting are deeply intertwined and networks play a key role. Second, I
analyze the social mode of warfare in globalist radical Islam. In the era of globalization,
we can see a shift from a focus on the “near enemy” to the “far enemy”, from a
hierarchical to a networked mode of organization, and from a localized to a globalized
operational base within radical Islam. I also examine the way in which ideas have
evolved through and because of time-space compression, and the effects of these on
globalist radical Islam. Finally, by discussing an individual case of radicalization, I show
how networks and ideas play into the creation of the radical.
Before proceeding further, three qualifications are in order. First and most
importantly, the purpose of this section is to apply the model discussed previously to
analyze contemporary jihadist violence. The focus is thus not on explaining the
motivational forces behind radical Islam but rather understanding what and how, rather
than why questions. Second, referring back to the introduction, I will not engage with the
Koran, the Hadith, or any other theological texts for two simple reasons; first, I have no
training in Koranic studies and second, as Olivier Roy notes, “the key question is not
what the Koran actually says, but what Muslims say the Koran says” (2006, p. 10).
Finally, the scope of this study prevents an extensive historical analysis of the emergence
of the globalist jihadist movement. This chapter takes some brief historical detours, but
my engagement with the matter does not do justice to its complexity.
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I.

Globalist Jihad and the Warfighting Paradigm

The 9/11 Commission Report notes that while fighting against the Soviets in
Afghanistan, Osama bin Laden realized the role played by actors located around the
globe in the success of the Taliban. Through what came to be known as the “Golden
Chain”, a financial network was built that connected Bin Laden’s group to numerous
contributors, including individuals, charities, governments, and non-governmental
organizations. Bin Laden “drew largely on funds raised by this network, whose agents
roamed world markets to buy arms and supplies for the mujahidin, or holy warriors”
(National Commission on Terrorist Attacks, 2004, p. 55). Resistance to the Soviets,
though certainly supported by state government, including the United States, was not
formally tied to any country (Alaxiev, 1988). The rise of the Afghan mujahidin and their
eventual success, albeit at tremendous human cost, at forcing the Soviets out paints a
classic picture, to use Herfried Münkler’s terminology, of the autonomization of violence.
Al Qaeda, while emblematic of the global jihadist movement, is by no means the
only relevant actor. Other factions, sometimes linked to Al Qaeda and sometimes
independent, have used similar networks to acquire arms. The Pakistan based Lakshar-ETaiba (LeT), for instance, which targeted British, American, and Israel citizens in its
recent attacks in the Indian city of Mumbai, has shifted from a Pakistani fundraising base
to a global one (Bajoria, 2008). The LeT started out with implicit support, both financial
and technical, of the Pakistani government, but since 9/11 (after which the government
turned hostile to the organization) it has become a more autonomous actor (Bajoria,
2008). Contemporary jihadist violence has gained prominence on the global stage partly
because of the autonomization of violent units.
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Moving on to Münkler’s other analytical insight, asymmetrical warfare has
become the norm in the contemporary jihadist movement. This should come as little
surprise. Faced with the much larger and better equipped state armies, jihadist factions
cannot sustain a “traditional” battle and have thus resorted to attacking at random, often
using the highly cost-effective method of the suicide operation. The role of the network
can be introduced here, as the martyr/warrior is rarely if ever a lone warrior. S/he is
connected to a larger project that consists of other foot martyr/warriors, bomb makers,
technical and financial planners, and ideologues. There has been much written about the
9/11 attacks that corroborates the claim that networks occupy a position of paramount
significance, so in an attempt to diversify the literature I will briefly discuss the attacks of
November 2008 in Mumbai, India. For now, the focus is on the warfighting techniques
and tactics employed by the attackers.
The network mode of organization and information and communications
technology played a key role in the 2008 Mumbai attacks. The attacks were coordinated
in Pakistan and the ten attackers went through a training process that including physical
and military training but also scrutiny of the areas they were to attack using Google Earth
(Bedi, 2008). Two Indian nationals have been arrested for scouting the target areas and
then presumably briefing attackers via informational networks (BBC News, 2009). The
ten attackers reached the port city of Mumbai on a hijacked vessel, using GPS equipment
to navigate their way and staying in touch with planners in Pakistan using a satellite
phone (Shachtman, 2008). Anonymous email accounts using remailers to scramble their
traces were used to take responsibility for the attacks. The attackers stayed in touch with
planners throughout the incident using cellular phones, an especially useful technology
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since the planners were able to update the attackers on the police and army response
detailed in the global media and coordinate attacks to extend their duration and
magnitude. The role of cell phones has been considered so central to the orchestration of
the event that “New York City police officials…are studying the feasibility of disrupting
cellphone communications in the event of a terrorist attack” (Baker, 2009).
The cell phones were Chinese made, purchased in Pakistan, using SIM cards from
eastern India and possibly New Jersey, and central to an attack on India’s west coast. The
attacks were asymmetrical, targeting civilians rather than state apparatus, and conducted
by autonomized violence making units. The example of the 2008 Mumbai attacks
strongly indicates the globalized, networked warfighting paradigm used by contemporary
globalist jihadists. By shifting to a more macroscopic lens, we can now analyze the social
mode of warfare in globalist radical Islam.

II.

Globalist Jihad and the Social Mode of Warfare

In the previous chapter, I argued that globalization has fundamentally transformed
the model of industrialized total war into one that is characterized by networks that are
mobile, fluid, flexible, and often transnational, even global. Ideas have also evolved both
through these globalized networks and in response to their emergence. This section first
details the networked, globalized socioeconomic characteristics of contemporary jihad. I
then examine the development of globalist radical ideology, characterized by a focus on
the “far enemy”, to replace “near enemy” based local radical views.
A. The globalist mode of warfare
60

In the previous section, I discussed the Mumbai attacks carried out by LeT.
Expanding the depth and breadth of our analysis, a quick overview of the organization
resonates strongly with the globalized social mode of warfare discussed in the previous
chapter. In an article for the Council on Foreign Relations, Jayshree Bajoria profiles the
LeT. Formed in the late 1980s to first recruit men for battle in Afghanistan and then
Kashmir, the LeT is the military wing of the larger organization Markaz-ad-Dawa-walIrshad. Both organizations have expanded operations in the last decade, and the LeT now
operates not only in Pakistan and India but also in Chechnya, Afghanistan, and perhaps
even Iraq. As Brajoria (2008) points out, “the group collects donations from the Pakistani
expatriate community in the Persian Gulf and Britain as well as from Islamic NGOs, and
Pakistani and Kashmiri businessmen”. In addition, Ashley Tellis of the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, in prepared testimony to the Committee on
Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, notes that not only do Al Qaeda and LeT
share similar ideological motivations but also training camps in Afghanistan (Tellis,
2009).
LeT is not alone in being linked to the Al Qaeda network, which acts as an
umbrella organization, providing financial, technical, or sometimes solely ideological
support to a number of globally based jihadist organizations. The 9/11 Commission
Report details the evolution of Al Qaeda, which evolved into central hub of a network of
like-minded groups first located primarily in North Africa, then expanding to the Middle
East, South Asia, and Southeast Asia. Less formal operations in the West are also
discussed in the Report. Flows between these networks take the form of monetary
transactions, weapons, tactics, and ideas.
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As detailed by Jessica Stern (2003), the birth of Al Qaeda is a story of global
networking. In its early years, Bin Laden provided financial assistance to the Egyptian
anti-statist group Egyptian Islamic Jihad (EIJ). Led at the time by Ayman al-Zawahiri,
EIJ’s “original objective was to fight the oppressive, secular rulers of Egypt and turn the
country into an Islamic state” (Stern, 2003, p. 28). The failure of state-oriented political
Islamist movements, that is movements that sought to establish Islamic states, has been
well documented by Olivier Roy in his The Failure of Political Islam (1995). To
summarize a far more intricate analysis, Roy argues that Islamist movements in a number
of post-colonial Muslim majority states failed to offer a viable economic and political
model to capitalism and the secular or pseudo-secular state. Consequently, by the mid1990s there was little popular support for such groups, especially those of the armed
variety. As it became evident that the Egyptian political Islamist movement was fizzling
out, al-Zawahiri merged his organization with Bin Laden’s, with the former providing
manpower and the latter the financial means. While EIJ was by far the largest group that
merged into Al Qaeda, similar groups in Uzbekistan, Sudan, Jordan, and, as discussed
above, Pakistan, as well as South East Asia have become nodes in the network where Al
Qaeda is the central hub. Each of these nodes, in cases like LeT where the organization is
large enough, often displays characteristics of a network, with actors located in
geographically dispersed locations.
Stern discusses the way in which different nodes connect and the key role of the
internet, a point picked up by Loretta Napoleoni in Terror Incorporated. Napoleoni
brings up the distribution of a “terror manual” after the train bombings in Madrid,
identifying the justification for such attacks which almost exclusively target civilians.
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The manual states that the Madrid attacks, and the earlier 9/11 strike and later London
bombings can be justified using a similar logic, are meant “to create a disruption in the
stability required for moving the economic sector toward development” (Napoleoni,
2005, p. 209). While the strategy of attacking the economic base of war dates back at
least to World War II, the difference here is that in Al Qaeda’s eyes the enemy is not an
army or a state but, seemingly, “economic development” in general. The targets for attack
are those that upset the functioning of social networks in general – business centers,
hotels (in Mumbai but also Jordan and Pakistan), and public transit systems (Madrid,
London) have little if any strategic value as targets, yet both the attack itself and more
importantly the creation of fear and panic, which seems to be the new strategic objective,
can hamper flows across nodes and thus disrupt networks.
Turning now to “home grown terror,” that is the radicalization of young people,
predominantly men, who are often born in and live in the West, provides further insight
into the role of globalization in the creation and permeation of radical Islam. Roy’s
(2006) work on understanding radical Islam (his terminology is “neofundamentalism”)
among European Muslims is noteworthy, even though his monolithic understanding of
Muslim migrants is problematic. Noting that, “a third of the world’s Muslims now live as
members of a minority” (p. 18), Roy’s central argument is that an adoption of
neofundamentalism is a result of Muslims trying to assert their identity in a globalized,
non-Muslim context. Traditionally, the immigrant experience in the West has been
explained through either assimilation (sacrificing unique cultural practices to become
Western), multiculturalism (cultural practices remain but groups are segregated, typified
by the Dutch policy of the same name from the 1970s to the 1990s), or the idea of a
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“melting pot” (immigrant groups interact freely with the host culture and there is no state
intervention, the United States being a commonly cited though imperfect example).
Arguing that none of these three models explains the experience of modern day Muslims
in Western society, Roy suggests that Western Muslims go through a process of
individual identity construction. Roy acknowledges that Muslims have lived as minorities
in non-Muslim lands for centuries, yet the contemporary experience of deterritorialization
is different:
While old minorities had time to build their own culture or to share the dominant
culture (Tatars, Indian Muslims, China’s Hui), Muslims in recently settled
minorities have to reinvent what makes them Muslim, in the sense that the
common defining factor of this population as Muslim is the mere reference to
Islam, with no common cultural or linguistic heritage. (p. 232)
The new identity is a hybrid of Western ideas and Islamic principles and this interaction
creates a religiosity that stresses “individualisation, the quest for self-realisation, the rethinking of Islam outside of a given culture, and the recasting of the Muslim ummah in
non-territorial terms” (Roy, 2006, p. 232). By examining the vast corpus of
contemporary Muslim discourse, especially Internet forums, Roy is able to provide ample
evidence to support this claim. Given the homogenizing trends that have accompanied the
global expansion of Western-style capitalism, a similar logic may also apply to nonmigrant Muslims living in the traditional “Islamic World”. The radical, then, can be
understood as a reaction to the homogenizing dynamic of globalizing Western capitalism.
However, these globalist radical ideas have not organically emerged around the world –
there has been a conscious project to spread this ideology. The next section discusses the
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emergence and distribution of these globalist radical ideas, which globalization playing
both a facilitative and inspirational role.
B. Radical ideas and globalization
Contemporary jihadist violence is targeted not at states or armies but at disrupting
socioeconomic networks. This is different from political Islamist groups that sought to
establish Islamic states. Without getting into theological interpretation, it is still possible
to see how globalist jihadist ideas have interacted with and expanded through networks
and globalization processes.
In understanding the role of ideas behind contemporary jihadist violence, it is
necessary to look at the thoughts of Sayid Qutb, who has been described as the founder of
radical Islam (Cook, 2005, p. 102) and the man who inspired Bin Laden (Irwin, 2001). As
I am consciously staying away from theology, I will focus on Qutb’s general ideas and
their influence rather than his interpretation of the Koran15. Writing in Egypt in the
1960s, Qutb believed that problems facing Muslims “stemmed from the fact that Muslim
societies were no longer ruled by Muslim norms and laws (the shari’a) and had become
apostate” (Cook, 2005, p. 103). To fix this situation, Qutb advocates placing violent jihad
as a pseudo-sixth pillar of Islam, believing that such a move would rid the Muslim world
of the ignorance that has caused its decline from world power to periphery.
Qutb’s ideas were influential in Egypt and served as bedrock for the Muslim
Brotherhood, a group that sought to establish Islamic states in Egypt, Palestine, and, with

It is worth noting that Qutb, unlike almost all Islamic scholars, focused exclusively on the
Koran, disregarding both the hadith and sunnah, which detail the life and words of
Muhammad and are generally regarded as key texts

15
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very limited success, elsewhere. Thus Qutb’s ideas were initially considered applicable at
the level of the state, and it wasn’t until the Soviet-Afghan war that they were explicitly
expanded to appeal at the global level. Abdullah Azzam had been advocating jihad for
the sake of global Islam since the 1970s in Palestine, where his calls for Muslim warriors
from around the world were never heeded (Cook, 2005, p. 128). By the time of the Soviet
invasion of Afghanistan, however, global networks connecting jihadists had begun to
form and now Azzam became an influential and significant proponent of a global jihad.
No longer was the focus on the “near enemy” of the non-Islamic state but instead Azzam
envisioned a globalist salvific jihad that would “revolutionize Muslim society and turn it
away from failure and impotence” (Cook, 2005, p. 130).
Osama Bin Laden was a student of Azzam and initially adopted many of his
ideas, though one of the defining features of the contemporary jihadist movement is its
ideational malleability. As discussed by Stern (2003), Al Qaeda’s philosophy responds to
changing socio-historical context and is open to influence by other, sometimes even nonIslamic, ideas. It is thus not surprising that, responding to interest from increasingly
diverse audiences, Bin Laden’s calls to holy war have become increasingly wider in their
scope. The first, in 1992, “urged believers to kill American soldiers in Saudi Arabia and
the Horn of Africa” (Stern, 2003, p. 29). The second in 1996 detailed Western atrocities
against Muslims while the third in 1998 specified attacking American civilians rather
than soldiers. This shift to targeting civilians has said to have disturbed several radical
networks, who began questioning Al Qaeda’s legitimacy to call for jihadist war. Then in
2002, Bin Laden’s statement to Al Jazeera emphasized “Israel’s occupation of Palestinian
lands and the suffering of Iraqi children under UN sanctions, concerns broadly shared in
66

the Islamic world” (Stern, 2003, pp. 29-30). The targets now were expanded further, with
the broadly identified “Jews and crusaders” referring to any non-Islamic institution,
group, or individual. Appealing to a wider audience with each dictate and expanding the
scope of legitimate targets, Al Qaeda’s ideology is clearly not set in stone.
To sum up the evolution of globalist jihadist ideology, early followers of Qutb’s
radical Islam, which placed violent jihad as a pseudo-sixth pillar of Islam, were antigovernmental in nature, targeting the “near enemy” of the state. Since then, through the
ideas of Azzam and the operations of Bin Laden, radical Islam has become globalist,
targeting the difficult to define “far enemy” that consists of states, civilians, and
socioeconomic networks considered un-Islamic. The 2008 attacks in Mumbai, conducted
by group previously focused on creating an independent, Islamic Kashmir, offers further
evidence of this globally aware ideology. The attackers in Mumbai were instructed not to
target the police, army, or even Indian civilians, but instead foreigners – citizens of the
US, Europe, and Israel (Blakely, 2008). Ideas driving the movement have transformed
from anti-statist to globalist, and thus the target is not the state but social networks.
Globalization and networks enable the spread of these globalist radical ideas to all
corners of the globe. Groups like Al Qaeda have been able to plant radical imams all over
the world, as evidenced by cases like Anwar al-Aulaqi in the United States (Schmidt,
2008), Abu Hamza in the United Kingdom (Casciani, 2004), and Abou Khaled in the
Netherlands (Buruma, 2006). It is difficult to imagine such a level of global coordination
in an era with less “time-space compression,” to refer back to Harvey’s terminology. In
addition, the Internet has played an important role in the dissemination of violent
radicalism. The World Wide Web can be used to identify and exploit sympathizers
67

(fundraise), spread propaganda (recruit and motivate), maintain anonymity, magnify the
perception of the power of radical groups, function as a command and control center, and
gather information on potential targets (Thomas, 2003). In a 2004 article, Brigit
Bräuchler explores how radical Islamic groups consider the Internet an important tool,
not only to plan and implement terrorist attacks but even to support the creation of radical
thoughts and ideas (Bräuchle, 2004). Bräuchler notes that radical Islamic groups use the
Internet to “construct an identity that is congruent with their offline philosophy but
extends its reach” (Bräuchle, 2004, p. 267). She proceeds to discuss how, by offering
skewed interpretations of religious and historical texts like the Koran and the hadith, as
well as contemporary news, radical groups are able to reach “a wide range of people
whose perception of Islam is strongly influenced by these presentations” (Bräuchle, 2004,
p. 268). It should come as no surprise that the chief webmaster for many Al Qaeda related
websites was considered “far more important than any foot soldier or suicide-bomber”
(The Economist, 2007). The Internet has allowed contemporary jihadists to convert youth
to their radical ideology, communicate while remaining anonymous, and plan attacks
without being geographically present.
For a final thought on the significance of ideas in globalist radical Islam, I turn to
Hamid Mir, a Pakistani journalist and Osama Bin Laden’s handpicked biographer
(Baldauf, 2001). Mir describes Bin Laden as a “cave man” with “an AK-47, a kilogram
of grenades, a kilogram of explosives, and a donkey” (as quoted in Baldauf, 2001). For
Mir, al-Zawahiri, as the thinker behind Al Qaeda, is far more important than Bin Laden,
who’s role is akin to that of a politician. Zawahiri “is not interested in fighting in the
mountains. He is thinking more internationally…He was behind the terrorist attacks on
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tourists [the 1997 attack in Luxor left 58 dead]. He is the person who can do the things
that happened on Sept. 11” (as quoted in Baldauf, 2001). Representing the persuasive and
intellectual side of Al Qaeda, it is evident that al-Zawahiri – the visionary of the
organization – occupies a position of considerable significance.
Globalization and networks have had a significant impact on the nature,
production, and distribution of ideas. Ideas have determined and been determined by the
mode of warfare employed in contemporary jihadist violence. Globalist radical Islam
works through global networks, making extensive use of information and communication
technologies. The aims and means of the movement are increasingly globalist. By
analyzing the case of Mohammed Bouyeri, the Dutch Muslim student who murdered
filmmaker Theo Van Gogh, we can more specifically see the ways in which globalist
networks and ideas combine.

III.

The case of Mohammed B.

Mohammed B., as he is most commonly known, seemed by all accounts to be a
well integrated Dutch-Moroccan living in Amsterdam. Born to first-generation Moroccan
immigrants, Bouyeri went to university, had a Dutch girlfriend, enjoyed drinking beer
and smoking marijuana with both other immigrants and ethnic Dutch friends, and seemed
like a case of multiculturalism going well. Yet over the course of a year, starting in
February 2003, he completely deserted “Western values” and became increasingly radical
(Buruma, 2006, p. 192). Not surprisingly, perhaps, this radicalization occurred
immediately after a number of personal setbacks: his mother passed away, he was
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rejected by a number of employers, and a community center he was working to build was
refused funding by the government. He blamed the Netherlands’ unfair treatment of
Muslims for these events. Around the same time, Mohammed began meeting Abou
Khaled, a radical Syrian preacher with possible ties to Al Qaeda. Khaled taught
Mohammed B. and his “close circle of like-minded friends,” what became the Hofstad
Network, a violent, radical version of Islam with a specific focus on hating “the infidels”
(Buruma, 2006, p. 211).
The Hofstad Network of the Netherlands centered around Khaled and its members
consisted mostly of second generation Muslim immigrants, but it was involved in flows
that transcended national borders. It is believed that “Hofstad was connected to networks
in Spain, Morocco, Italy, and Belgium, and it was planning a string of assassinations of
Dutch politicians, an attack on the Netherlands' sole nuclear reactor, and other actions
around Europe” (Leiken, 2005). European intelligence has also found links between
Hofstad and a group that bears key responsibility for the Madrid train bombings and the
Casablanca attacks in 2003 (Leiken, 2005). Khaled arrived in the Netherlands on a
mission to expand globalist radical Islam, and in Bouyeri he found a willing disciple.
Bouyeri turned to the internet to pursue his interest in jihad, and soon he was hosting
meetings where downloaded videos of executions in the Middle East and other similar
propagandistic material were shown. He also began maintaining a website where he
would post ideological tracts (Buruma, 2006).
Yet despite Mohammed’s increasing devotion to globalist radical Islam, he
“remained incredibly Dutch”, and here is an appropriate point to introduce a discussion of
ideas (Buruma, 2006, p. 213). Unlike previous historical eras, where the individual was
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unlikely to encounter ideas outside of those available and relevant to her/his immediate
environs, the globalization of information technology has allowed for the widespread
dissemination of a multitude of ideas and ideologies. Mohammed seemed attracted to
globalist jihad but retained a fiercely liberal understanding of the key role of the
individual and thus his approach to violence came from a very individualized
internalization of jihadist Islam. For Mohammed, this was not a fight for Islam in Israel
or Chechnya or Iraq, but rather in the Netherlands. As he stated during his trial,
Mohammed could not live in a liberal democratic society because free speech allowed
people to insult Allah and the Koran (Buruma, 2006, p. 189). Yet it was exactly through
the political liberties afforded to the Dutch that Mohammed planned on waging his larger
battle. He wrote:
Since the Dutch political system encourages its citizens (especially the
alochtonen, the Muslims) to take an active part in the problems of
society…people did indeed rise to take on social responsibilities. Such
people not only shouldered responsibilities for The Netherlands, but for
the whole world. They will liberate the world from democratic slavery (as
quoted in Buruma, p. 217).
As Buruma notes, despite his pessimistic view regarding the state of Islam in the world,
Mohammed believed that “rescue was at hand” because “the knights of Islam would rise
from…the Netherlands” (Buruma, 2006, p. 217).
In November 2004, Mohammad B. shot and killed the controversial and
provocative filmmaker Theo Van Gogh, who had earlier made a film, Submission, which
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was highly critical of Islam. Stabbed into his chest was a letter, written in a Dutch that
had been through “several layers of awkward translation…much of Bouyeri’s knowledge
of radical Islamist rhetoric came from English translations of Arabic texts downloaded
from the internet” (Buruma, 2006, p. 4). The letter was addressed to Ayaan Hirshi Ali, a
fervently anti-Islamic Dutch politician, and directly threatened Dutch politicians, the
Dutch state (which was “controlled by Jews”), America, Europe, and infidels in general
(Browne, 2004). The investigation into the murder later found a CD-Rom at Bouyeri’s
house containing videos of jihadist violence. The CD-Rom was edited in London and the
videos, which included the execution of American Daniel Pearl, were from a Saudi
Arabian website (Buruma, 2006, p. 4).
The case of Mohammad B. serves to demonstrate the role of networks,
technology, and ideas in globalist radical Islam. Part of what Roy calls the
deterritorialized Muslim population, Bouyeri, under the tutelage of a Syrian preacher,
linked into a network that spread around the globe and had a globalist agenda. His
actions, while local, sought to resonate with a much wider population, thus his claim that
his target was not just Van Gogh but the Dutch state, Europe, America, and infidels
everywhere. Studying the processes of globalization provides useful insight into what
contemporary jihadist violence is and how it came about.

IV.

Conclusion

The warfighting paradigm adopted by contemporary jihadists is globalist in
nature. Networks play a key role, linking together actors in geographically discontinuous
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regions from various socioeconomic backgrounds. The targets chosen for attack are
rarely military. The purpose of these attacks is not to “defeat” the enemy but rather to
disrupt networks. As such, random and suicidal operations are especially effective,
causing fear and panic and hampering the continuation of daily life. Targeting hotels,
economic hubs, and transportation systems seems to be especially preferred. The cost of
attacks is minimal and represents an asymmetrical opposition to the technologically
advanced and/or manpower intensive armies of states. Easily available information
technology is used extensively and flows across globally located actors take the form of
arms, finances, and ideas.
The way radical groups organize for and implement war further supports the
central role of globalization processes. Networks are created through interpersonal
interactions as well as anonymous association over the internet. These networks have
brought together several previously discrete actors. Both through these networks and
because of them, radical Islam has increasingly become more globalist not only in its
nature but also in its outlook. Anti-governmental Islamist groups have shifted focus to the
“far enemy”, attacking global socioeconomic networks instead of local governance
structures. Through networks and the unprecedented expansion of information
technology, radical ideas have reached individuals in all corners of the globe.
The case of Mohammad Bouyeri, a radical Dutch Muslim who murdered
filmmaker Theo Van Gogh, supports the arguments above. Bouyeri directly targeted a
local celebrity, but he saw his enemy in global terms. Linked to a jihadist network by
Syrian preacher, Bouyeri looked to the internet for inspiration and documented the
evolution of his ideology on a personal website. Bouyeri assassinated Van Gogh in a
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public place in broad daylight, maximizing the creation of fear and panic. Mohammad B.,
it is appropriate to say, can be studied as a symbol of the New War.
The goals of radical Islam have evolved from being anti-governmentalist, focused
on establishing Islamic states, to globalist, aimed at establishing Islam at the center of the
world system. The targets attacked are no longer state related but rather civilians and
networks that have become central organizational units in the contemporary era. Attacks
are more symbolically than strategically important (though destroying symbols is its own
strategy) and intended to disrupt the risk management principles that have, according to
Ulrich Beck, become the basic tenets of present day societal organization. Globalist
jihadists are not, like their Islamist predecessors, hierarchically organized but rather
diffuse and protean. Globalization has both enabled the creation of globalist jihadist
networks and influenced its evolving ideology.
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FIVE

Conclusion

Every war is different, every war is the same.
-

Anthony Swofford, Jarhead

I. Summing Up
An appropriate theory for the transformation of war through globalization should
explain how globalization processes have affected change in the institution of war. By
approaching the subject from three temporal perspectives, it is possible to identify and
specify the nature and change in the transformation of war in the contemporary era.
Furthermore, it is important to consider agency, and thus an analysis of war must also
discuss the role of ideas. This paper has attempted to build such a model. However, a
theoretical framework is useful only if it helps us understand what it is trying to explain.
By applying the model developed earlier to contemporary jihadist violence, perhaps the
primary topic on the contemporary security agenda, it is evident that globalization has
indeed had a profound effect on war.
I began this project by pointing out the distinction between the unchanging nature
of war and its mutable character. I then discussed the role of globalization processes,
specifically the rise of network societies and the role of information technologies, in
transforming the character of war. Using a Braudelian model, I approached the subject of
war from the temporal perspectives of l’histoire évenméntielle, conjunctural time, and the
longue durée. The analytical units specific to war that spawned out of Braudel’s lenses
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were the warfighting paradigm, the social mode of warfare, and the historical structure of
war. Globalization has deeply affected change in the warfighting paradigm and the social
mode of warfare. There is also evidence that from the perspective of the longue durée war
may be undergoing transformation, though it is too soon to reach definitive conclusions
on this matter. Given the broad historical nature of the longue durée and the relative
recency of the globalization phenomenon, analyzing the historical structure of
contemporary jihadist violence would be unwise at this time.
Examining contemporary jihadist violence from the perspective of l’histoire
évenméntielle and conjunctural time, it is evident that this New War analysis helps
explain what this form of warfare is and how it occurs. Globalization has both enabled the
creation of globalist jihadist networks and influenced its evolving ideology. Radical jihad
is globally oriented and functions through networks, making extensive use of information
and communication technologies. The following table summarizes some of the ways in
which the transformation of war through globalization manifests itself in contemporary
globalist jihad.
Unit of Analysis

Warfighting
Paradigm

Social Mode of
Warfare

Historical Structure
of War

Effects of Globalization

Contemporary globalist jihad
•

•
•
•

Asymmetry
Autonomization
Globally oriented through
transnational networks

•

Networked, linking military,
political, economic actors
Ideas evolve through and because
of networked organization

•

Risk as constitutive antagonism?
Decentralized political architecture

•

•

•
•

•
•

•

Cost effective methods
like suicide attacks
Globally orchestrated
Arms and finances flow
between, across, and
through networks
Globally located networks
bringing together
financiers, ideologues,
foot soldiers
Shift from statist to
globalist ideology
Not specifiable
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The framework discussed above is worth pursuing further, yet there are two
shortcomings that need be addressed. First, network theory in general remains a fledgling
approach that requires further theorization. Castells’ work, first published more than a
decade ago, has spawned noteworthy offshoots in diverse fields including urban
sociology and cultural sociology, yet with the exception of Duffield’s work there has
been little theoretical analysis of network war. The role of communications technology is
rarely discussed by scholars of war outside the narrowly focused “strategic studies” field,
where nothing beyond the warfighting paradigm is considered. It is likely that as the scale
and scope of social transformation through the rise of network societies becomes better
understood, scholars of war will further explore the deeper and wider implications of
networks.
A second area where the Braudelian model of this paper does not help us is in
understanding the motivations, the why, of contemporary jihadist violence. The what and
how questions are important, to be sure, but there is much about this movement that we
cannot understand. It may be that because networks can bring together discrete
individuals, it will become more and more difficult to answer the why questions regarding
social movements. In somewhat more specific terms, social movements in previous eras
were generally united by a common cause, a motivation around which people were
mobilized, but because of the rise of networks it may be that individual rather than group
motivations need to be examined. A more likely and feasible task may be to look at
specific groups. We may, for example, be able to generalize across radical jihadists in
England, but their motivations could be very different from those of radical jihadists in
Pakistan.
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Addressing these above two shortcomings would greatly improve the New War
framework, though it is difficult to see how, with regard to the second point above, a
structural approach can address motivation. Perhaps that task is better left to
psychoanalysts, especially given the increased individualization that characterizes new
social movements. Political science in general has yet to properly understand
globalization, with the focus being on either l’histoire évenméntielle or the longue durée,
while it may be that conjunctural analysis is most useful.

II. What next?
The broadly defined New War framework has come a long way since it was first
proposed in the 1990s. In the aftermath of 9/11, it had somewhat diminished in popularity
as scholars chose alternative methods to explain contemporary jihadist violence. This
paper indicates that, adequately theorized, the notion that globalization has transformed
the character of war deserves further exploration. The warfighting paradigm and the
social mode of war in the contemporary period are likely to be affected by globalizing
contextual forces. My study examined an explicitly globalist form of violence, but I
would predict that even more territorially contained conflicts, for example in Sri Lanka,
Palestine, and Mexico, may be better understood through the framework offered here.
Work by scholars like Duffield and Kaldor has previously discussed the role of global
networks in local conflicts, and in taking segmented globality seriously the next step
would be to discuss particular examples of New War.
More specifically with regard to the conflict addressed in this paper, there is a
need to better understand the ideological evolution of globalist jihad. With rare

78

exceptions, efforts at understanding contemporary jihadist violence rarely seek to explain
why and how the ideology became globalist. There is an unnecessary tendency to either
essentialize the “Muslim World” and treat it as a monolithic, historically continuous
whole, or to ignore the role of ideas altogether. The development of globalist ideology is
not purely a theological matter and deserves further analysis through the tools of political
science and sociology. The role of history and context must be considered when
discussing both globalization and war, or for that matter any socially embedded
institution.
Policy oriented scholars may also seek to examine the political implications of
New War. There is little doubt that network societies and globalized information
technologies are here to stay, so reversing this trend is an unlikely solution. By
understanding how New Wars like globalist jihad work, it may be possible to more
effectively design policy and governance structures. Scholars like Ulrich Beck and David
Held have begun advocating for a more consciously promoted cosmopolitan system of
global governance to effectively manage an increasingly globalizing world, though far
more research on the matter is needed.
The tendency of policymakers to focus on analyzing phenomenon in the
immediate term, using the time frame of l’histoire évenméntielle, is worth commenting
on. While there is no doubt that some problems need immediate, effective, and efficient
responses, in general an approach more in line with conjunctural analysis may be useful.
New War is a case in point, where focusing on immediate actions may detract from long
term solutions. It appears increasingly likely that the state in its 20th century form may be
unsuitable to govern today and tomorrow, and the sooner that policymakers and policy
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thinkers realize this the better. Acknowledging that historical processes are far too
complicated to be addressed with quick-fix policies would add some much needed
humility to the work of policy designers.

To paraphrase Manuel Castells, the contemporary moment is one of incredible
change across the social landscape. Through processes of time-space compression,
human activity at many levels – economic, cultural, political – has been transformed in a
number of ways. War, as a socially embedded institution, has been caught up in the tide
of globalization and undergone a shift at least at the level of the warfighting paradigm
and the social mode of warfare. The effects of globalization at the level of the long durée,
both specific to war and more generally, are more ambiguous, and it is necessary to be
careful and specific when discussing socio-structural transformation.
The speed, scale, and scope of globalization are not fully understood, neither is
the trajectory of social life in the 21st century. The ways in which social phenomenon are
transformed through globalization is likely to be explored for years to come, and I can
think of no better way to conclude than to restate the provocation from the YouTube
video cited at the start of this essay, and urge scholars to take up the challenge of
responding: What does all this mean?
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